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GAZING INTO THE CRYSTAL BALL: REFLECTIONS
ON THE STANDARDS STATE JUDGES SHOULD USE
TO ASCERTAIN FEDERAL LAW
DONALD H. ZEIGLER*
INTRODUCTION
Federal and state courts routinely interpret and apply each
other's law. Federal courts must apply state law under the Rules
of Decision Act1 as construed in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins2
and its progeny. State courts must apply federal law under the
Supremacy Clause.3 Federal courts use a single approach for as-
certaining state law in cases in which it applies: they decide is-
sues of state law the way they think the state supreme court
would decide them.4 State courts, by contrast, do not use a uni-
form approach for ascertaining federal law. Instead, they use a
wide variety of approaches.
Virtually all state courts agree that they are bound by U.S.
Supreme Court5 decisions interpreting federal law. When the
Supreme Court has not spoken, however, there is little agree-
ment on how to proceed. State courts vary greatly in the weight
they give to lower federal court decisions: some consider them-
* Professor of Law, New York Law School. A.B. 1966, Amherst College; J.D.
1969, Columbia University. The author thanks Brannon Heath, Randolph Jonakait,
and Edward A. Purcell for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this Article.
1. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 1652 (1994)).
2. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
3. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
4. See Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465 (1967) (noting that
federal courts are bound by the decisions of a state's highest court in determining
questions of state law and must ascertain what the state law should be after giving
"proper regard" to lower state court holdings); infra notes 211-17 and accompanying
text.
5. Subsequent references to the U.S. Supreme Court in this Article will be de-
noted as "Supreme Court"; references to the highest court of an individual state will
use the state name as a modifier.
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selves bound by such decisions; others ignore them entirely.
Most state courts take a position somewhere between these two
extremes. State courts generally give only brief, conclusory rea-
sons for the approaches they follow. Courts deciding that they
are not bound by lower federal court decisions almost never go
on to articulate or explain the standards they use to ascertain
federal law. Scholarly treatment of this issue is similarly brief
and conclusory.6
This Article fills the need for a comprehensive analysis of the
standards that state courts use to ascertain federal law. I pro-
pose that state courts adopt a uniform approach for ascertaining
federal law that is analogous to the approach the federal courts
6. The two main works on the subject are quite short and were written years
ago. See Andrew A. Matthews, Jr., Comment, The State Courts and the Federal
Common Law, 27 ALB. L. REV. 73 (1963); Note, Authority in State Courts of Lower
Federal Court Decisions on National Law, 48 COLUM. L. REV. 943 (1948). Several
scholars have made brief mention of the issue in articles that focus on other mat-
ters. Most of these scholars assert in conclusory fashion that the state courts must
obey the Supreme Court but are not bound by lower federal court decisions on feder-
al issues. A few acknowledge that a split of authority exists on this question. See,
e.g., Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?,
46 STAN. L. REV. 817, 825 n.32 (1994) (arguing that state courts are not bound by
lower federal court interpretations of federal law, but noting that there is precedent
to the contrary); Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism:
Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035, 1053 (1977) (asserting that "state
courts are not bound to respect the doctrinal statements of the inferior federal tribu-
nals insofar as they understand those statements not to be compelled by the Su-
preme Court"); Richard A. Matasar, Rediscovering 'One Constitutional Case": Proce-
dural Rules and the Rejection of the Gibbs Test for Supplemental Jurisdiction, 71
CAL. L. REv. 1399, 1422 n.94 (1983) (noting the split of authority on this issue);
Daniel J. Meltzer, State Court Forfeitures of Federal Rights, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1128,
1236 n.495 (1986) (stating that decisions of lower federal courts on issues of federal
law are only persuasive precedent for state courts); Robert A. Ragazzo, Transfer and
Choice of Federal Law: The Appellate Model, 93 MICH. L. REv. 703, 742 & n.254
(1995) (contending that state courts are not bound by lower federal court decisions
on issues of federal law because state court decisions are not appealed to the lower
federal courts); William W. Schwarzer et al., Judicial Federalism in Action: Coordi-
nation of Litigation in State and Federal Courts, 78 VA. L. REV. 1689, 1746-48
(1992) (asserting that most state courts do not consider themselves bound by lower
federal court decisions on federal law issues, but also noting the existence of a con-
trary school of thought); David L. Shapiro, State Courts and Federal Declaratory
Judgments, 74 NW. U. L. REV. 759, 771 (1979) (asserting that lower federal court
decisions are not binding as a matter of federal supremacy on state courts, and that
"federal courts are no more than coordinate with the state courts on issues of fed-
eral law").
STANDARDS TO ASCERTAIN FEDERAL LAW
use in ascertaining state law: state courts should decide ques-
tions of federal law the way they think the Supreme Court
would decide them. This approach would best further the goals
of correct and uniform interpretation of federal law. As a corol-
lary, I contend that categorical rules concerning the effect of
lower federal court decisions are neither necessary nor appropri-
ate. Instead, state courts should determine pragmatically what
weight to give lower federal court decisions.'
Part I begins by explaining why the question of state court
standards for ascertaining federal law is inherent in the basic
governmental structure established by the Framers and the
First Congress. It also offers some surmises about why the issue
did not arise in the early years of the Republic. Part I then trac-
es the myriad of approaches that state courts use to ascertain
federal law and briefly discusses federal court opinion on the
matter. It concludes by reviewing the policy reasons state and
federal courts give for the diverse positions they take.
Part II makes the case for my proposal. It begins by exploring
whether the Constitution or historical practice requires or pre-
cludes any particular approach to ascertaining federal law. It
concludes that state courts are free to choose any approach they
wish as long as it is not a subterfuge for ignoring federal law.
Part II next identifies and discusses the goals that the standards
should seek to achieve. It contends that the standards should
help state courts interpret federal law correctly and help achieve
national uniformity in the interpretation of that law. Finally, it
explains why the approach I suggest would bring us closest to
achieving those goals.
Part III explains how this proposal would apply in practice. If
state judges are to decide issues of federal law the way they
think the Supreme Court would decide them, these judges must
have some idea of the process that the Supreme Court follows.
Describing this process is not easy; there is' no official handbook
explaining it. Several judges and scholars have written about
the art of judging,8 yet the process remains mysterious. Part III
7. Congress or the Supreme Court probably could require state courts to use
particular standards for ascertaining federal law. See infra note 201. Neither institu-
tion has shown any inclination to do so.
8. Classic works include BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PRO-
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discusses what Judge Frank Coffin calls "craft skills" 9 -that is,
the day-to-day practices that the Supreme Court follows in ap-
plying the rules of stare decisis and statutory construction. It
then offers some general suggestions to assist state judges in
making predictions. Finally, Part III discusses five different sit-
uations that state judges routinely face in ascertaining federal
law and makes specific suggestions as to how they should pro-
ceed.
I. THE MANY APPROACHES TO ASCERTAINING FEDERAL LAW
A. Early History
The issue of what standards state courts should use to ascer-
tain federal law is inherent in the governmental structure estab-
lished by the Framers and the First Congress. Against the back-
drop of the state courts, the Framers created a Supreme Court 0
and extended the new federal judicial power to, inter alia, all
cases in law and equity arising under the Constitution, laws,
and treaties of the United States.1 During both the Constitu-
tional Convention and the state ratification conventions that
followed, delegates generally agreed that state courts could also
decide issues of federal law.'2
CESS (1921); JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930); Felix Frankfurter,
Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REv. 527 (1947); Ernst
Freund, Interpretation of Statutes, 65 U. PA. L. REV. 207 (1917); and Roscoe Pound,
The Theory of Judicial Decision, 36 HARV. L. REV. 641 (1923). For excellent recent
works, see FRANK M. COFFIN, ON APPEAL: COURTS, LAWYERING, AND JUDGING (1994); WIL-
LiAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIc STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994); BERNARD SCHWARTZ,
DECISION: How THE SUPREME COURT DECIDES CASES (1996).
9. See FRANK M. COFFIN, THE WAYS OF A JUDGE 195-96 (1980).
10. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
11. See id. § 2. In accord with common practice, throughout this Article I will
refer to such jurisdiction as "arising under" jurisdiction. Although the delegates to
the Constitutional Convention initially voted not to create lower federal courts, they
subsequently approved the famous "Madisonian Compromise" that deferred the issue
for later decision by Congress. See 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787,
at 125 (Max Farrand ed., 1966) [hereinafter RECORDS]; 2 id. at 38-39. The intro-
ductory language of Article III reads: "The judicial Power of the United States, shall
be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may
from time to time ordain and establish." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
12. Delegates who opposed the creation of lower federal courts specifically argued
that state courts could hear all cases initially, with possible Supreme Court review
1146
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When the First Congress created the lower federal courts'3
and gave them a portion of the subject matter jurisdiction al-
lowed by Article III,14 the stage was set for the issue to emerge.
Two court systems existed, state and federal, both with power to
hear and decide cases raising issues of federal law. The Suprem-
acy Clause required state courts to follow federal law in cases in
to insure a uniform interpretation of national law. See, e.g., 1 RECORDS, supra note
11, at 124 (statement of John Rutledge) ("IT]he State Tribunals might and ought to
be left in all cases to decide in the first instance the right of appeal to the supreme
national tribunal being sufficient to secure the national rights & uniformity of
Judgmts . . . ."); 2 id. at 45 (statement of Pierce Butler) (arguing that lower federal
courts were unnecessary and that the state courts "might do the business"); 4 DE-
BATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN
1787, at 155 (Jonathon Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836) (statement of Mr. Spencer) (arguing
that lower federal courts should be jettisoned and cases arising under federal law
left to the state courts with possible Supreme Court review). Those favoring the cre-
ation of lower federal courts stressed the need for a national judiciary, see, e.g., 4 id.
at 158 (statement of Mr. Davie) (pointing out that the arising under jurisdiction pro-
vided the central means for enforcing federal law), minimized the scope of its juris-
diction, see, e.g., 3 id. at 553 (statement of John Marshall) (noting that the arising
under jurisdiction would be limited to matters about which Congress could legislate),
and asserted that jurisdiction would be concurrent with the state courts in most cas-
es. See, e.g., 3 id. at 554 (statement of John Marshall) (noting that the state courts
"have a concurrence of jurisdiction with the [lower] federal courts in those cases in
which the latter have cognizance"); 4 id. at 141 (statement of Gov. Johnston) ("[Tihe
opinion which I have always entertained is, that they will, in these cases, as well as
in several others, have concurrent jurisdiction with the state courts, and not exclu-
sive jurisdiction.").
13. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §§ 2-4, 1 Stat. 73, 73-75 (creating federal
district and circuit courts).
14. Congress did not give the lower federal courts any original arising under ju-
risdiction in civil cases. Thus, litigants were forced to bring these cases in state
court. See Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 245 (1967); The Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. (4
Wall.) 411, 430 (1866); PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART AND WECHsLER'S THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 960 (3d ed. 1988). Congress gave the lower federal
courts almost all of the original criminal arising under jurisdiction possible under
Article III. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §§ 9, 11, 1 Stat. 73, 76-79. Congress
conferred no arising under removal jurisdiction. Congress also granted the circuit
courts original jurisdiction, "concurrent with the courts of the several States," of all
civil cases in which the matter in dispute exceeded $500 and "an alien is a party,
or the suit is between a citizen of the State where the suit is brought, and a citizen
of another State." Id. § 11, 1 Stat. at 78. The 1789 Act also granted removal juris-
diction in diversity cases. See id. § 12, 1 Stat. at 79-80. For an account of the devel-
opment of the arising under jurisdiction, see Donald H. Zeigler, Twins Separated at
Birth: A Comparative History of the Civil and Criminal Arising Under Jurisdiction of
the Federal Courts and Some Proposals for Change, 19 VT. L. REV. 673 (1995).
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which it applied. 5 In time, the state courts would face issues of
federal law that already had been decided by either the Supreme
Court or lower federal courts. The questions became: What stan-
dards should state courts use to ascertain federal law? What
effect should they give to decisions of the Supreme Court and
the lower federal courts?
Although these questions might have arisen soon after the
country was formed, apparently no early cases addressed them.
16
Several factors may have kept these questions from surfacing. In
the early days of the country, Congress enacted few federal
statutes. 7 Thus, there were few federal statutory rights to en-
force in state or federal court, and few issues of statutory inter-
pretation on which state and federal courts might differ. In ad-
dition, the Supreme Court held in Barron v. Mayor of Balti-
more8 that the Bill of Rights applied only to the federal govern-
ment and not to the states, 9 thus eliminating an important area
in which federal and state courts might have disagreed as to the
proper meaning of federal law.
Although the First Congress created lower federal courts, it
did not confer any general civil arising under jurisdiction on
them.2 ° Almost all civil cases arising under federal law had to be
brought in state court.2' Consequently, the lower federal courts
15. The Clause reads:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby,
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary not-
withstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
16. The earliest statement on the subject I have found is in an old treatise. The
author states, without citation, that "[iln cases in which the construction of the
United States statutes is involved, it is the duty of the State courts to follow the
decisions of the United States courts." GEORGE C. HOLT, THE CONCURRENT JURISDICTION
OF THE FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS 160 (1888).
17. See Henry J. Friendly, Federalism: A Foreword, 86 YALE L.J. 1019, 1020
(1977) (discussing the limited use of the federal government's powers during the first
one hundred years of the country).
18. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
19. See id. at 247.
20. See supra note 14.
21. See id.
1148
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had little opportunity to develop a body of decisions interpreting
federal law except in those relatively rare instances in which
Congress gave them subject matter jurisdiction.22 The First Con-
gress did confer almost all of the general criminal arising under
jurisdiction on the lower federal courts, 23 and later Congresses
routinely shared jurisdiction over federal statutory crimes with
the state courts.24 Although state courts might have considered
how to ascertain federal law in such cases, it is unclear how of-
ten federal prosecutors actually proceeded in state court.
Several developments in the second half of the nineteenth cen-
tury ensured that the issue addressed in this Article would
finally capture judges' attention. The Civil War and Reconstruc-
tion fundamentally altered the balance of federal and state pow-
22. The district courts were given limited powers in proceedings to revoke
wrongfully obtained patents. See Act of April 10, 1790, ch. 7, § 5, 1 Stat. 109, 111.
Later, they were authorized to hear some patent infringement suits. See Act of Feb.
21, 1793, ch. 11, § 6, 1 Stat. 318, 322. The federal courts were also given jurisdic-
tion, concurrent with the state courts, over claims by Canadian refugees dispossessed
for aiding the colonies during the Revolutionary War. See Act of April 7, 1798, ch.
26, § 3, 1 Stat. 547, 548. Another Act imposed a duty on both federal and state
courts to issue writs of habeas corpus to secure release of federal soldiers arrested
for nonpayment of debt or breach of contract. See Act of May 28, 1798, ch. 47, § 14,
1 Stat. 558, 560-61. It seems unlikely that major differences of opinion between
federal and state judges would emerge in such cases.
One would not expect the grant of diversity jurisdiction to bring the issue of
which standards state courts should utilize when interpreting federal law to the fore.
Although federal issues may arise in diversity cases, such actions generally center on
state-created rights and duties.
23. See supra note 14.
24. See Zeigler, supra note 14, at 709-13.
25. During the early years of the Republic, the states appeared to spend more
time openly challenging federal authority than meekly attempting to ascertain and
apply federal law. For example, in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 304
(1816), the Virginia Supreme Court refused to obey the mandate of the Supreme
Court in a case involving interpretation of a federal treaty, claiming that the Su-
preme Court had no power to review state court judgments and that section 25 of
the Judiciary Act of 1789 was unconstitutional. See id. at 305-06. Not surprisingly,
the Supreme Court rejected Virginia's challenge to its authority. See id. at 333-52.
In addition, several state courts refused to hear cases brought under federal criminal
statutes. They held that it was unconstitutional for Congress to authorize state
courts to hear federal criminal cases, relying on a principle of international law that
one country will not enforce the penal laws of another. See, e.g., Ely v. Peck, 7
Conn. 239, 242-43 (1828); State v. Pike, 15 N.H. 83, 84-85 (1844); Jackson v. Rose, 4
Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 124, 128 (1815). Courts openly defying federal judicial and legisla-
tive authority were not likely to address the present issue.
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er. The federal government moved to consolidate its power and
to expand national authority. 6 Congress protected federal rights
against state infringement by passing the Thirteenth,27 Four-
teenth,2" and Fifteenth Amendments,29 and by enacting waves of
enforcement legislation." Congress finally conferred the general
original civil arising under jurisdiction on the lower federal
courts and made it concurrent with the state courts,3 1 and the
Supreme Court made it clear that Congress can require the
state courts to hear both civil and criminal cases arising under
federal law.32 As the century drew to a close, Congress enacted
significant regulatory legislation.33
All of these developments combined to create the modern
framework in which the question of what standard state judges
should use to ascertain federal law was almost certain to arise
on a regular basis. The state courts were bound to hear federal
claims and to apply federal law in many instances. The grant of
general original civil arising under jurisdiction to the lower fed-
eral courts allowed them to begin to develop a general body of
26. See Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 246-47 (1967); FELIX FRANKFURTER &
JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT. A STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDI-
CIAL SYSTEM 57-58, 65 (1928); Felix Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Be-
tween United States and State Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 499, 507-11 (1928).
27. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (abolishing slavery in the United States).
28. Id. amend. XIV (defining U.S. citizenship and establishing rights of due pro-
cess and equal protection for all citizens).
29. Id. amend. XV (establishing right to vote for U.S. citizens).
30. See Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 502 (1982); Mitchum v. Foster,
407 U.S. 225, 238-39 (1972); FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 26, at 65. See gen-
erally William M. Wiecek, The Reconstruction of Federal Judicial Power, 1863-1875,
13 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 333, 336-52 (1969) (examining grant of various jurisdictional
powers by Congress to the federal courts during Reconstruction); Donald H. Zeigler,
A Reassessment of the Younger Doctrine in Light of the Legislative History of Re-
construction, 1983 DUKE L.J. 987, 989, 992-1020 (examining Congressional enactment
of "wave after wave of enforcement legislation").
31. See Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470.
32. See Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 135-37, 140 (1876); Zeigler, supra note
14, at 751-53.
33. See, e.g., Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887) (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.); Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat.
209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994)). Congress enacted more regu-
latory legislation in the early years of the twentieth century. See Friendly, supra
note 17, at 1022.
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decisional law construing federal enactments. 4 The steady
stream of federal regulatory legislation also created many feder-
al rights that could be enforced in either state or federal court. 5
B. State Court Approaches to Finding Federal Law
State courts finally began to address the standards for ascer-
taining federal law at the turn of the century. Early decisions
held that state court judges were bound by Supreme Court
cases interpreting federal law. 6 The state courts promptly split
on whether they were bound by lower federal court decisions
interpreting federal law.3 ' Discussions tended to be wholly
34. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
35. Congress does not always specifically state whether jurisdiction over particu-
lar claims is exclusive or concurrent with the state courts. Since Claflin, jurisdiction
is presumed to be concurrent unless Congress specifically says otherwise, or unless
concurrent jurisdiction would seriously compromise federal interests. See Tafflin v.
Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990); Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473,
478 (1981); Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 507-08 (1962).
36. See, e.g., Southern Ry. Co. v. Harrison, 24 So. 552, 557 (Ala. 1898) (stating
that if a national law "has received a construction from the highest national tribu-
nal, its decision is supreme, and by it the state courts are bound"); Stock v.
Plunkett, 183 P. 657, 657 (Cal. 1919) ("The decisions of [the Supreme Court] are
binding on this court ... ."); Burnham v. Ft. Dodge Grocery Co., 123 N.W. 220, 221
(Iowa 1909) ("So far as the general construction to be put upon an act of federal
legislation is concerned, the Supreme Court of the United States is final authori-
ty . .. ."); Walters v. Commonwealth, 250 S.W. 839, 841 (Ky. 1923) ("[Alt least until
[the Supreme Court] passes upon the question, we are not willing to surrender our
own judgment ... ."), overruled in part by Henson v. Commonwealth, 347 S.W.2d
546 (Ky. 1961); State v. Intoxicating Liquors, 49 A. 670, 671 (Me. 1901) ("[Wle must
certainly recognize the authority of [the Supreme Court] in passing upon a provision
of the federal constitution and upon congressional legislation thereunder, and be gov-
erned by the result."); McDonald v. Pennsylvania R.R., 136 N.E. 894, 895 (Ohio
1922) ("f[I]n the construction and application of such federal laws the decisions of our
highest federal court must necessarily control."); Noble v. Dibble, 205 P. 1049, 1049
(Wash. 1922) ("[IThe highest court of a state is ... bound by the decisions of...
the Supreme Court of the United States."); Stuart v. Farmers' Bank of Cuba City,
117 N.W. 820, 823 (Wis. 1908) ([hIf the Supreme Court had finally spoken on [the
construction of the Bankruptcy Act] we should, of course, be guided by such utter-
ance.").
37. For state courts holding themselves bound by lower federal court decisions,
see, for example, Handy v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 160 So. 530, 530 (Ala.
1935) (recognizing that a state court is bound by a federal circuit court decision
construing and applying a federal statute); Mackenzie v. Hare, 134 P. 713, 714 (Cal.
1913) (recognizing that state courts are "bound by the interpretation put upon [the
Constitution and federal statutes] by the courts of the United States"), decree affd,
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conclusory. Courts simply stated that they were bound-or were
not bound-and generally provided neither citation nor analy-
sis.3 8 State courts holding that they were not bound by lower
federal court decisions gave no indication of how they would as-
certain federal law. 9
Today, virtually all state courts agree that they are bound by
Supreme Court decisions construing federal law,40 but they agree
239 U.S. 299 (1915); Atlas Mut. Ben. Ass'n v. Portscheller, 46 A.2d 643, 646 (Del.
1945) (recognizing that state courts should resolve due process issues in accordance
with decisions of the Supreme Court "and other federal courts"); Luken v. Lake
Shore & M.S. Ry. Co., 94 N.E. 175, 178 (Ill. 1911) (holding that state courts are
bound by the construction placed on a federal statute by federal courts); Bocian v.
Union Pac. R. Co., 289 N.W. 372, 374 (Neb. 1939) (holding that "pertinent opinions
of the federal courts are binding on state courts" in the administration of a federal
statute); Brenen v. Dahlstrom Metallic Door Co., 178 N.Y.S. 846, 848 (App. Div.
1919) (recognizing that states should follow decisions of the federal courts in con-
struing the Bankruptcy Act, "even if they are in conflict with our decisions"); Jones
v. Erie R.R., 140 N.E. 366, 368 (Ohio 1922) (recognizing that Ohio courts should
follow "the construction of federal statutes which have been made by federal courts");
State v. Ford Motor Co., 38 S.E.2d 242, 248 (S.C. 1946) (recognizing that certain
issues in the case were "subject for their final solution to the United States Consti-
tution and the interpretative decisions of the Federal Courts").
For cases in which state courts determined that they were not bound by lower
federal court decisions, see, e.g., Stock v. Plunkett, 183 P. 657, 657 (Cal. 1919) (rec-
ognizing that federal circuit court decisions are entitled only to "great weight" in
determining a federal question); Lewis v. Braun, 191 N.E. 56, 59 (Ill. 1934) (recog-
nizing that a federal circuit court decision "is not binding upon this court"); Iowa
Nat. Bank v. Stewart, 232 N.W. 445, 454 (Iowa 1930) (recognizing that state courts
are "not concluded by" decisions of lower federal courts), rev'd on other grounds sub
noma. Iowa-Des Moines Nat'l Bank v. Bennett, 284 U.S. 239 (1931); Brown v. Palmer
Clay Prods. Co., 195 N.E. 122, 123 (Mass. 1935) (recognizing that state courts are
"not concluded by" decisions of lower federal courts on questions involving federal
statutes), affd, 297 U.S. 227 (1936); State ex rel. St. Louis B. & M. Ry. Co. v.
Taylor, 251 S.W. 383, 388 (Mo. 1923) (recognizing that state courts are not bound by
federal district court decisions), affd, 266 U.S. 200 (1924); New York Rapid Transit
Corp. v. City of New York, 9 N.E.2d 858, 860 (N.Y. 1937) (noting that a federal
court determination, while entitled to great weight, is not binding on a state court),
affd on the merits, 303 U.S. 573 (1938); Harrison v. Barngrover, 72 S.W.2d 971, 974
(Tex. Civ. App. 1934) (stating that a federal circuit court's holding is "not binding
upon us here"); Noble v. Dibble, 205 P. 1049, 1049 (Wash. 1922) (holding state court
not bound by decisions of any federal court except the Supreme Court).
38. See, e.g., Handy, 160 So. at 530; Mackenzie, 134 P. at 779; New York Rapid
Transit, 9 N.E.2d at 860.
39. See, e.g., New York Rapid Transit, 9 N.E.2d at 860.
40. See, e.g., Stallworth v. City of Evergreen, 680 So. 2d 229, 234 (Ala. 1996)
("Alabama Courts must apply Federal constitutional law as enunciated by the United
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on little else. The state courts take an extraordinary number of
different positions on the "elusive" question of the effect of lower
federal court decisions.41 The positions fall on a spectrum rang-
ing from "slavishly follow" to "totally disregard" and include just
about every position imaginable in between.
In the absence of Supreme Court precedent, some state courts
consider themselves bound by lower federal court decisions when
the lower federal courts are in agreement." When the lower fed-
States Supreme Court...."); Rohr Aircrai Corp. v. County of San Diego, 336 P.2d
521, 524 (Cal. 1959) ("[We are bound by interpretations of federal statutes by the
United States Supreme Court."), rev'd on other grounds, 362 U.S. 628 (1960); People
v. Barber, 799 P.2d 936, 940 (Colo. 1990) (holding that Supreme Court "decisions on
federal law bind all lower state and federal courts"); Indiana Dep't of Pub. Welfare
v. Payne, 622 N.E.2d 461, 468 (Ind. 1993) ("Supreme Court decisions pertaining to
federal questions are binding on state courts."); Littlefield v. State, 480 A.2d 731,
737 (Me. 1984) ([A] decision of the Supreme Court of the United States is the su-
preme law of the land on a federal issue . . . ."); Commonwealth v. Hill, 385 N.E.2d
253, 255 (Mass. 1979) ("We are of course bound by decisions of the Supreme Court
on questions of Federal law ... ."); Bargas v. Warden, 482 P.2d 317, 318 (Nev.
1971) ("We are bound by the decisions of the United States Supreme Court."); State
v. Coleman, 214 A.2d 393, 402 (N.J. 1965) ("We, of course, recognize that the United
States Supreme Court is the final arbiter on all questions of federal constitutional
law."); Flanagan v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 495 N.E.2d 345, 348 (N.Y. 1986)
("[W]e are bound to apply the statute as interpreted by Supreme Court decision ...
."); Shaw v. PACC Health Plan, Inc., 908 P.2d 308, 314 n.8 (Or. 1995) ("[Federal
court decisions .. .issued by the Supreme Court, are . .. binding on this court.");
Barstow v. State, 742 S.W.2d 495, 501 n.2 (Tax. App. 1987) ("On questions of federal
law-such as the proper interpretation of a federal statute-all courts in every state
owe obedience to the Supreme Court of the United States."); State v. Mechtel, 499
N.W.2d 662, 666 (Wisc. 1993) ("Certainly, the United States Supreme Court's de-
terminations on federal questions bind state courts."). But see Wimberly v. Labor
Indus. Relations Comm'n, 688 S.W.2d 344, 350 (Mo. 1985) (Donnelly, J., concurring
in result) (suggesting that state courts are bound by Supreme Court decisions inter-
preting federal statutes but not by Supreme Court decisions interpreting the federal
constitution), affd on the merits, 479 U.S. 511 (1987). Consider also the following
colloquy between a Queens County, New York, Criminal Court Judge and Professor
Donald Doernberg of Pace University Law School, then an attorney for the New
York City Legal Aid Society. Professor Doernberg was arguing a suppression motion,
and cited Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). The Judge asked, "What
court decided that, counselor?" Doernberg answered, 'That was the United States Su-
preme Court, Your Honor." The Judge responded, "Well, that doesn't mean anything
down here." Telephone Conversation with Donald L. Doernberg, Professor, Pace Uni-
versity Law School (Mar. 13, 1998).
41. See People v. Stansberry, 268 N.E.2d 431, 433 (Ill. 1971).
42. See, e.g., People v. Riggs, 568 N.W.2d 101, 106 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997) ("Mich-
igan adheres to the rule that a state court is bound by the authoritative holdings of
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eral courts disagree, some state courts consider themselves
bound by the better reasoned rule.43 Most state courts facing this
situation consider themselves free to make their own indepen-
dent determination." State courts will sometimes go to great
lengths to find a conflict in federal court decisions so that they
may decide the federal question as they wish.45
federal courts regarding federal questions when there is no conflict."); Flanagan, 495
N.E.2d at 348 ("[WMe are bound to apply the [federal] statute as interpreted by Su-
preme Court decision or, absent such, in accordance with the rule established by
lower Federal courts if they are in agreement."); Alvez v. American Export Lines,
Inc., 389 N.E.2d 461, 463 (N.Y. 1979) ("Wlere there a uniform Federal rule, albeit
one established by lower Federal courts, we would be bound . .. to apply it."), affd
on the merits, 446 U.S. 274 (1980). Wisconsin sometimes takes this position. Com-
pare Thompson v. Village of Hales Corners, 340 N.W.2d 704, 712-13 (Wis. 1983) ("'If
there were no difference of opinion among [the federal] courts, or indeed if the su-
preme court had finally spoken on that subject, we should of course be guided by
such utterance.'" (quoting Stuart v. Farmers' Bank, 117 N.W. 820, 823 (Wis. 1908)),
with State v. Mechtel, 499 N.W.2d 662, 666 (Wis. 1993) ("It is clear, however, that
determinations on federal questions by either the federal circuit courts of appeal or
the federal district courts are not binding upon, state courts." (citing Thompson, 340
N.W.2d at 712-13)).
43. See, e.g., Hagler v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 381 So. 2d 80, 82 (Ala. Civ. App.
1980) ("[W]hen the [federal] decisions are in conflict we believe that we are free to
follow and apply the better reasoned decision."); Stallings v. Spring Meadows Apart-
ment Complex, 886 P.2d 1373, 1377 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) (finding, when faced with
conflicting precedents from the Fifth and Ninth Circuits, that "the interpretation
adopted by the Ninth Circuit [is] the better reasoned rule and binding on us"), va-
cated, 913 P.2d 496 (Ariz. 1996).
44. See, e.g., Schueler v. Weintrob, 105 N.W.2d 42, 48 (Mich. 1960) ("[W]here the
Federal circuit courts of appeals themselves are in disagreement upon the proper in-
terpretation of a Federal act, we feel free to choose the view which seems most ap-
propriate to us."); Flanagan, 495 N.E.2d at 348 (holding that when there is no uni-
formity in the decisions of the lower federal courts, a state court "has the same re-
sponsibility as the lower Federal courts and is not precluded from exercising its own
judgment"); Stuart, 117 N.W. at 823 ("[W]here variant views are entertained [in the
lower federal courts], it is the duty of this court to decide for itself.").
45. For example, in Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 577 A.2d 1239 (N.J.
1990), plaintiff sued defendant for failing to warn of the dangers of smoking its
product and for fraud and misrepresentation in advertising. See id. at 1239. The de-
fendant argued that the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act preempted
the plaintiffs state law claims. See id. at 1241. Five federal circuit courts had ruled
on the issue, including the Third Circuit, which encompasses New Jersey. See id. at
1246. All found preemption. See id. Two of the circuit court decisions, however, re-
versed district court decisions that had found no preemption. See id. In addition, a
Minnesota intermediate appellate court found no preemption, although that decision,
like the federal district court decisions, had been reversed on appeal. See id. at
1246-47. The New Jersey Supreme Court found the overturned decisions more per-
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Courts often say that they are bound by lower federal court
decisions interpreting federal statutes,4" suggesting that they
might follow a different rule in cases raising federal constitu-
tional issues. The Illinois Supreme Court explicitly follows this
dual approach, holding itself bound by lower federal court deci-
sions interpreting federal statutes47 but not bound by such deci-
sions interpreting the Federal Constitution.4' The court gives no
suasive and followed them in finding no preemption. See id. at 1247.
46. See, e.g., Stallings, 886 P.2d at 1376 ("[We are bound by the decisions of
the federal courts interpreting federal statutes."); Busch v. Graphic Color Corp., 662
N.E.2d 397, 403 (111. 1996) ("[D]ecisions of the Federal courts interpreting a Federal
act ... are controlling upon Illinois courts."); Fox v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 890
S.W.2d 408, 410 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) ("Because this court is construing a federal
statute, the decisions of the United States Supreme Court and of the federal courts
interpreting that statute are binding."); Anderson v. Wagner, 296 N.W.2d 455, 458
(Neb. 1980) ("ffIn the administration and interpretation of federal legislative acts,
pertinent opinions of the federal courts are binding upon the state courts."); Hobbs
Lumber Co. v. Shidell, 326 N.E.2d 706, 709 (Ohio Ct. C.P. Belmont County 1974)
("It is well-settled law that this court is bound by the construction of federal stat-
utes as determined by federal courts.").
47. See, e.g., Busch, 662 N.E.2d at 403 ('[Dlecisions of the federal courts inter-
preting a Federal act . . . are controlling upon Illinois courts."); Arnold v. Babcock &
Wilcox Co., 507 N.E.2d 218, 222 (Ill. 1987) ("IT]he decisions of the federal courts are
controlling upon our court in the interpretation of a federal statute." (quoting Golden
Bear Family Restaurants v. Murray, 494 N.E.2d 581, 584 (Ill. 1986))); Boyer v.
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 230 N.E.2d 173, 176 (Ill. 1967) ("In constru-
ing the Federal Safety Appliance Act, as with other Federal statutes, we must look
to the Federal decisions for its interpretation."); Elgin, Joliet & E. Ry. Co. v. Indus-
trial Comm'n, 138 N.E.2d 553, 555 (Ill. 1956) ("The decisions of the Federal courts
are controlling upon our court in the interpretation of a Federal statute."); Erhart
v. Elgin, Joliet & E. Ry. Co., 92 N.E.2d 96, 98-99 (Ill. 1950) (same).
48. See, e.g., People v. Williams, 641 N.E.2d 296, 321 (Ill. 1994) ("[Dlecisions of
lower Federal courts on Federal constitutional questions are not binding on State
courts."); People v. Barrow, 549 N.E.2d 240, 267 (Ill. 1989) ("Until the Supreme
Court of the United States has spoken, State courts are not precluded from exercis-
ing their own judgments on Federal constitutional questions."); People v. Sanchez,
546 N.E.2d 574, 579 (Ill. 1989) (declining to follow federal decisions allegedly estab-
lishing a due process right to immunity), dismissal of post-conviction relief affd, 662
N.E.2d 1199 (1996); Chicago v. Groffinan, 368 N.E.2d 891, 894 (Ill. 1977) (agreeing
with federal circuit court that local ordinance was unconstitutional, with the caveat
that a state court can consider "the issue independent of the decisions of the Fed-
eral courts"); People ex rel. Illinois Fed'n of Teachers v. Lindberg, 326 N.E.2d 749,
754 (Ill. 1975) ("But even if [a federal circuit court decision] is to be considered as
affording a Federal constitutional basis for plaintiffs' challenge, this court is not
bound by that case."); People v. Stansberry, 268 N.E.2d 431, 433 (Ill. 1971) (holding
that when the Supreme Court has not spoken and the lower federal courts disagree,
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reason for making this distinction; indeed, the court never actu-
ally discusses it. It simply follows different rules in the two situ-
ations.49 Maine and Vermont, by contrast, give more deference to
lower federal court decisions that interpret the Constitution
than to those that interpret federal statutes.5 New Jersey and
New York firmly refuse to differentiate, giving equal weight to
both.5'
Some state courts choose to give greater weight to opinions of
their own federal circuit than to decisions of other circuits. 2
decisions of the lower federal courts on a Fourth Amendment question are "certainly
not binding on State courts").
49. The Illinois Supreme Court cannot be unaware of its different approaches in
statutory and constitutional cases. In 1987, an Illinois intermediate appellate court
wrote a long opinion carefully tracing the two lines of authority. See Netzel v. Unit-
ed Parcel Serv., 520 N.E.2d 665, 668-71 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987). The Illinois Supreme
Court subsequently reversed on the merits in a supervisory order without addressing
the question. See Netzel v. United Parcel Serv., 537 N.E.2d 1348, 1349 (Ill. App. Ct.
1989).
50. See, e.g., State v. Knowles, 371 A.2d 624, 628 (Me. 1977) ("'[It is a wise pol-
icy that a state court of last resort accept, so far as reasonably possible, a decision
[of its federal circuit court on a federal constitutional question] . . . .'" (quoting State
v. Lafferty, 309 A.2d 647, 667 (Me. 1973) (Wernick, J., concurring))); State v. Austin,
685 A.2d 1076, 1080 (Vt. 1996) ("[A] state court . . .should give due respect to the
decisions of the lower federal courts, particularly on questions involving the United
States Constitution.").
51. See, e.g., Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 577 A.2d 1239, 1244 (N.J.
1990) (noting that past precedent did not distinguish "between the binding effect of
decisions involving constitutional interpretation and those involving statutory inter-
pretation .... Consequently, we reject any such distinction, and clarify that in nei-
ther situation are the decisions of the lower federal courts 'binding' per se.");
Flanagan v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 495 N.E.2d 345, 348 (N.Y. 1986) (noting the
coures past willingness to disagree with federal circuit courts on both federal statu-
tory and constitutional questions). Cf Pope v. State, 396 A.2d 1054, 1062 n.10 (Md.
1979) ("[Dlecisions of federal circuit courts of appeals construing the federal constitu-
tion and acts of the Congress pursuant thereto, are not binding upon us.")
52. See, e.g., Red Maple Properties v. Zoning Comm'n, 610 A.2d 1238, 1242 n.7
(Conn. 1992) ("[Dlecisions of the federal circuit in which a state court is located are
entitled to great weight in the interpretation of a federal statute."); Pignato v. Great
W. Bank, 664 So. 2d 1011, 1015 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) ("[Alccording unusual
weight to a decision on an issue rendered by a federal circuit in which the state is
located is an appropriate method for deciding federal questions where there is no
Supreme Court authority."); Littlefield v. State, 480 A.2d 731, 737 (Me. 1984) ("[In
the interests of existing harmonious federal-state relationships, it is a wise policy
that a state court of last resort accept, so far as reasonably possible, a decision of
its federal circuit court on ... a federal question."); Abbott v. Goodwin, 804 P.2d
485, 490 (Or. Ct. App. 1991) (stating that although not bound by lower federal court
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Others, however, explicitly decline to do so.53 Some courts are
particularly reluctant to follow their own circuit when it is in
the minority.54 In addition, examples abound of state courts re-
fusing to follow a lone district court ruling.5'
decisions, "under principles of federalism, we not only defer to federal court prece-
dents, we should give weight to those of the Ninth Circuit, in which Oregon lies"),
modified on other grounds, 809 P.2d 716 (Or. 1991); Chiropractic Nutritional Assocs.
v. Empire Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 669 A.2d 975, 980 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995)
("When possible, it is appropriate for the Superior Court of Pennsylvania to follow
the Third Circuit's ruling on federal questions to which the United States Supreme
Court has not yet provided the ultimate answer.").
53. See, e.g., Debtor Reorganizers v. State Bd. of Equalization, 130 Cal. Rptr. 64,
67 (Ct. App. 1976) ("As between the decisions of the Ninth Circuit and that of the
Fifth Circuit, no primacy inheres in the former, so the persuasiveness of the conflict-
ing views must depend upon the validity of the arguments made therein."); Kraus v.
Board of Educ., 492 S.W.2d 783, 786 (Mo. 1973) (refusing to follow an Eighth Cir-
cuit precedent in favor of an opinion from the Ninth Circuit); Flanagan, 495 N.E.2d
at 348 (stating that when lower federal courts disagree, a state court is not "bound
to follow the decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals within the territorial
boundaries of which it sits"); Barstow v. State, 742 S.W.2d 495, 500-01 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1987) (noting that other circuits differ from the Fifth Circuit, and "[wie are not
bound to follow [Fifth Circuit precedent] merely because Texas lies within the geo-
graphical limits of the Fifth CircuitV); Thompson v. Village of Hales Corners, 340
N.W.2d 704, 712-13 (Wis. 1983) (rejecting argument that the trial court erred in fol-
lowing the Third Circuit rather than the Seventh Circuit).
54. See, e.g., Amerada Hess Corp. v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 627 So. 2d
367, 372-73 (Ala. 1993) (declining to follow the Eleventh Circuit's "approach that, in
this Court's view, is inconsistent with the principles of maritime law and has no
support among the rest of the federal circuits that have addressed this issue");
Thomas v. Miller, 906 S.W.2d 260, 261-62 (Tex. App. 1995) (declining to follow a
Fifth Circuit decision with which only the Federal Circuit agreed and seven other
federal circuit courts, as well as the Texas Supreme Court disagreed); Turner v. PV
Int'l Corp., 765 S.W.2d 455, 468-70 (Tex. App. 1988) (refusing to follow a Fifth Cir-
cuit decision because it is against the weight of federal authority).
State courts tend to give district court decisions somewhat less weight than cir-
cuit court decisions, although they rarely explicitly differentiate between the two.
See, e.g., State ex rel. St. Louis B. & M. Ry. Co. v. Taylor, 251 S.W. 383, 388 (Mo.
1923) (declining to follow a federal district court decision, but strongly implying it
would follow "an authoritative expression from the federal appellate courts"), a)ld on
the merits, 266 U.S. 200 (1924). Cf Yniquez v. Arizona, 939 F.2d 727, 736-37 (9th
Cir. 1991) (suggesting that state courts should give federal circuit court decisions
more weight than district court decisions).
55. See, e.g., Seibold v. State, 253 So. 2d 302, 309 (Ala. 1970); People v. Barber,
799 P.2d 936, 939-40 (Colo. 1990); Bradshaw v. State, 286 So. 2d 4, 6-7 (Fla. 1973);
People v. Del Vecchio, 544 N.E.2d 312, 327 (Ill. 1989); Hanch v. K.F.C. Natl Man-
agement Corp., 615 S.W.2d 28, 32-33 (Mo. 1981); Blanton v. North Las Vegas Mun.
Court, 748 P.2d 494, 499-500 (Nev. 1987), affd on the merits sub nom. Blanton v.
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Special problems arise when a criminal defendant seeks feder-
al habeas corpus review of a state conviction. When a criminal
defendant cites a constitutional ruling from a federal district or
circuit court that would entitle him to habeas relief,56 some state
courts consider themselves bound by the ruling. For example, in
Commonwealth v. Negri,57 the defendant confessed to police after
he was arrested and while he was without counsel.58 The defen-
dant had not been advised of his right to remain silent or to
have counsel, but he also had not affirmatively requested coun-
sel.59 After the defendant's conviction, the Supreme Court decid-
ed Escobedo v. Illinois," which could have been read to make
the defendant's confession inadmissable.6" The Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court initially read Escobedo narrowly,62 but the Third
Circuit interpreted Escobedo to require that counsel be afforded
unless waived.63 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded
that it should follow the Third Circuit rule until the Supreme
Court spoke further.64 Other state courts have given lower
federal court decisions great deference when habeas review is
possible,65 or have made practical accommodations to avoid a
federal-state conflict.
66
City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538 (1989). Courts are particularly reluctant to
follow a district court decision when that decision conflicts with the state court's
own precedent. See, e.g., Barber, 799 P.2d at 939; Bradshaw, 286 So. 2d at 7; People
v. Terrell, 547 N.E.2d 145, 166-67 (Ill. 1989).
56. This situation is less likely to occur after the Supreme Court's decision in
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), its progeny, and the recent congressional
changes to habeas procedure. See infra notes 349-75 and accompanying text.
57. 213 A.2d 670 (Pa. 1965).
58. See id. at 671.
59. See id.
60. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
61. See Negri, 213 A.2d at 671.
62. See id. (citing Commonwealth v. Patrick, 206 A.2d 295 (Pa. 1965); Common-
wealth ex rel. Linde v. Maroney, 206 A.2d 288 (Pa. 1965)).
63. See id. (citing United States ex reL. Russo v. New Jersey, 351 F.2d 429 (3d
Cir. 1965), vacated by New Jersey v. Russo, 384 U.S. 889 (1966)).
64. See id. at 672.
65. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Masskow, 290 N.E.2d 154, 157 (Mass. 1972); see
also Commonwealth v. Montanez, 447 N.E.2d 660, 661-62 (Mass. 1983) (stating that
the court would assume that the federal circuit court reached the "correct result" in
a case where the court's decision was reviewable in habeas corpus proceeding); Com-
monwealth v. Hill, 385 N.E.2d 253, 255 (Mass. 1979) (same).
66. See, e.g., State v. Coleman, 214 A.2d 393, 402-04 (N.J. 1965) (disagreeing
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On the other hand, state courts in criminal cases sometimes
refuse to follow lower federal court rulings, even though the
defendant can seek federal habeas review. The Illinois death
penalty cases provide a dramatic example. On April 29, 1989, a
federal district court held the Illinois death penalty statute un-
constitutional. 7 In People v. Del Vecchio,68 decided June 19,
1989, the Illinois Supreme Court refused to follow the federal
district court decision, holding that state courts are not bound by
lower federal court decisions on constitutional questions.6 9 In
three cases decided on October 25, 1989, the court reiterated the
rationale of Del Vecchio and explained that it had considered
and rejected in previous cases the claims that the federal court
found meritorious.7 0 The court stuck to its guns in subsequent
cases. 1 Finally, on May 2, 1990, the Seventh Circuit reversed
the federal district court decision, 2 thus vindicating the Illinois
Supreme Court's stand on the constitutionality of the state
death penalty statute.7
with Third Circuit about the meaning of Escobedo, but directing that when practi-
cable, prosecutors must try cases without confessions or postpone trials until the
Supreme Court clarified the law).
67. See United States ex rel. Silagy v. Peters, 713 F. Supp. 1246 (C.D. Ill. 1989),
affd in part, rev'd in part, 905 F.2d 986 (7th Cir. 1990). The court held that the
statute violated the Eighth Amendment because it did not contain adequate guide-
lines for when prosecutors might seek the death penalty, thus inevitably leading to
arbitrary and capricious action, and because it denied defendants the right to effec-
tive counsel and to basic due process because it lacked adequate notice provisions
for when death would be sought. See id. at 1258-60.
68. 544 N.E.2d 312 (Ill. 1989).
69. See id. at 327.
70. See People v. Barrow, 549 N.E.2d 240, 266-67 (IM. 1989); People v.
Kokoraleis, 547 N.E.2d 202, 228-30 (Ill. 1989); People v. Terrell, 547 N.E.2d 145,
166-67 (Ill. 1989).
71. See, e.g., People v. Bean, 560 N.E.2d 258, 292-93 (IlL 1990) (declining to fol-
low the federal district court and noting that the court had previously rejected the
defendants' challenges to the death penalty statute); People v. Fields, 552 N.E.2d
791, 817-18 (Ill. 1990) (same).
72. See Silagy v. Peters, 905 F.2d 986, 1013 (7th Cir. 1990).
73. State v. Austin, 685 A.2d 1076 (Vt. 1996), overruled by State v. Austin, 685
A.2d 1076 (Vt. 1996), provides another example of a state court declining to follow a
lower federal court ruling despite the fact that the defendant might seek federal
habeas review. In State v. Finch, 569 A.2d 494 (Vt. 1989), the Vermont Supreme
Court held that reliable hearsay could be admitted at a probation revocation hearing
without violating the probationer's confrontation rights. See id. at 495. Subsequently,
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In addition to having to decide whether they should give their
own circuit court (or local district court) more deference than
other federal courts, lower state courts face a further dilemma,
When the state's highest court and the lower federal courts dis-
agree about the meaning of federal law, lower state courts must
decide whose interpretation they should follow. Once again, the
courts split. Many choose to follow their state's highest court.74
the U.S. District Court for the District of Vermont granted Finch habeas relief, hold-
ing that the judge at the revocation hearing must also specifically find good cause
for not allowing confrontation. See Finch v. Vermont Dist. Court, No. 90-09, 1990
WL 312576, at *5 (D. Vt. Sept. 24, 1990). In Austin, the Vermont Supreme Court
recognized that the reasons for following the federal district court decision in Finch
were "especially strong" because the difference of opinion arose "through the federal-
state habeas corpus process." Austin, 685 A.2d at 1080. Nonetheless, the court re-
fused to follow the federal district court because it thought the district court's view
was not shared by at least five federal circuit courts of appeals. See id.
Sometimes state courts initially defer to the federal courts, but then lose pa-
tience. Consider the following saga from Maryland. A state statute provided that, in
criminal cases, 16 and 17 year olds were to be treated as adults in the City of Bal-
timore but as juveniles in the rest of the state. See Long v. Robinson, 316 F. Supp.
22, 23-24 (D. Md. 1970), affd, 436 F.2d 1116 (4th Cir. 1971). On August 6, 1970, a
federal district court held the statute unconstitutional on equal protection grounds.
See id. at 30. The court made the decision applicable to all cases not finally decided
on May 15, 1969, the day the suit was filed. See id& at 31. The Fourth Circuit af-
firmed without disturbing the effective date set by the district court. See Long v,
Robinson, 436 F.2d 1116 (4th Cir. 1971). In Franklin v. State, 285 A.2d 616 (Md.
1972), the Maryland Court of Appeals accepted Long, including the effective date, to
avoid adding to the confusion in the processing of juveniles in Baltimore. See id. at
617-19. Subsequently, the Fourth Circuit decided that Long should be retroactively
applied. See Woodall v. Pettibone, 465 F.2d 49, 50 (4th Cir. 1972). The Maryland
Court of Appeals had heard enough. When asked to go along with the Fourth Cir-
cuit, it refused, stating that: "the holding of that court in this matter is not binding
upon us. We shall decline most respectfully to accede to the point of view there ex-
pressed since we believe it to be in error." Wiggins v. State, 344 A.2d 80, 81 (Md.
1975).
74. See, e.g., Harrison v. State, 791 P.2d 359, 363 (Alaska Ct. App. 1990) ("In
the absence of a controlling decision by the United States Supreme Court, it would
appear that this court would be bound to follow a decision of the Alaska Supreme
Court on an issue of federal law despite conflicting lower federal court decisions.");
State v. McCandless, 461 A.2d 1205, 1207 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1983) (stating
that despite a contrary Third Circuit decision, "[wie are . . . bound in such circum-
stances by the pronouncements of our State Supreme Court"); People v. Brown, 653
N.Y.S.2d 544, 544 (App. Div. 1997) ("[Wlhere there is a conflict between the deci-
sional law of the [New York] Court of Appeals and that of an intermediate Federal
appellate court, the ruling of the state Court of Appeals should be followed."); Zurich
Gen. Accident & Liab. Ins. Co. v. Lackawanna Steel Co., 299 N.Y.S. 862, 868 (Sup.
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For example, in Benford v. State,75 the Georgia Court of Appeals
determined that it was not necessary even to consider the per-
suasiveness of lower federal court decisions because the Georgia
courts had ruled on the issue.76 In Thomas v. Miller,7 the Texas
Court of Appeals sidestepped a split in the lower federal courts
on the meaning of recent amendments to the Bankruptcy Code
by holding that it was obliged to follow the Texas Supreme
Court's position on the issue.78 The lower courts in Missouri
believe that the Missouri state constitution compels them to
follow the Missouri Supreme Court over the lower federal
courts . 7 9
Other state courts follow the lower federal courts.80 In Netzel
v. United Parcel Service,8 for example, the Appellate Court of
Illinois faced a conflict between Illinois Supreme Court prece-
dent and a recent Seventh Circuit decision on whether federal
law preempted a state retaliatory discharge claim. 2 The Appel-
Ct. 1937) (noting that trial courts follow intermediate state appellate courts over
lower federal courts). Justice Thomas of the U.S. Supreme Court adheres to this
view. See Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 376 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring)
("An Arkansas trial court is bound by this Court's (and by the Arkansas Supreme
Court's and Arkansas Court of Appeals') interpretation of federal law, but if it fol-
lows the Eighth Circuit's interpretation of federal law, it does so only because it
chooses to and not because it must.").
75. 377 S.E.2d 530 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989).
76. See id. at 531. The Court went on to deny defendant's claim based on sever-
al Georgia Supreme Court cases. See id. at 531-32.
77. 906 S.W.2d 260 (Tex. App. 1995).
78. The Texas Supreme Court followed the clear majority position. See id. at
261-62.
79. See State v. Wilkinson, 861 S.W.2d 746, 749 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993); Trimble v.
State, 693 S.W.2d 267, 276 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
80. See Stallings v. Spring Meadows Apartment Complex, 886 P.2d 1373, 1376-77
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1994), vacated on other grounds, 913 P.2d 496 (Ariz. 1996) (stating
that the court is bound by federal court decisions interpreting federal statutes and
noting that the state supreme court concurs in that view); Penbrook Hauling Co. v.
Sovereign Constr. Co., 319 A.2d 277, 280 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1974), affid, 346
A.2d 433 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975) (stating that the state supreme court's dif-
ferent result was not dispositive because "[i]n interpreting and applying federal stat-
utes we are bound by federal and not state decisional law"); Washington v. Hoke,
544 N.Y.S.2d 942, 943 (Sup. Ct. 1989) (recognizing that state courts are bound by
federal district courts rather than state intermediate appellate courts on issues of
federal law).
81. 520 N.E.2d 665 (Il1. App. Ct. 1987).
82. See id. at 667-68.
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late Court resolved the conflict by citing Illinois Supreme Court
cases holding that state courts are bound to follow lower federal
court interpretations of federal statutes. 3 The Court concluded:
"We believe this analysis reveals that we are bound, at the di-
rection of the Illinois Supreme Court itself, to follow the Seventh
Circuit's Lingle decision that the Illinois tort of retaliatory dis-
charge is preempted by section 301 of the [National Labor Man-
agement Relations Act]. Accordingly, we so hold."84
Courts holding that they are not technically bound by lower
federal court decisions also vary widely in the effect they give
those decisions. Some courts are very deferential, saying that
lower federal court decisions are "persuasive and entitled to
great weight,"" or "entitled to substantial deference, "86 or are
"highly respectable and persuasive authority.""7 Courts making
such statements usually follow the federal cases,88 although
exceptions to this pattern do occur.89 State courts often say that
83. See id. at 668-69.
84. Id. at 671. The Supreme Court subsequently reversed the Seventh Circuit on
the merits, holding that such claims were not preempted. See Lingle v. Norge Div.
of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 413 (1988). The Illinois Supreme Court then re-
versed the Appellate Court decision in Netzel in a supervisory order. See Netzel v.
United Parcel Serv., Inc., 537 N.E.2d 1348, 1349 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989).
85. People v. Bradley, 460 P.2d 129, 132 (Cal. 1969); see also Conrad v. Bank of
America, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 336, 347 (Ct. App. 1996) ("entitled to great weight"); York
v. Gaasland Co., 250 P.2d 967, 971 (Wash. 1952) (same).
86. Yee v. City of Escondido, 274 Cal. Rptr. 551, 552 (Ct. App. 1990), affd on
the merits, 503 U.S. 519 (1992).
87. Delaney v. Lakeside Villa, Ltd., 440 S.E.2d 668, 670 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993); see
also Phillips v. Williams, 608 P.2d 1131, 1135 (Okla. 1980) ("highly persuasive").
88. See, e.g., Conrad, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 346-47 (following federal cases on the
effect to be accorded plaintiffs' bankruptcy proceedings in subsequent litigation with
creditors); State v. Sebastian, 701 A.2d 13, 27-35 (Conn. 1997) (following a Ninth
Circuit decision in holding that defendant was not an "Indian" entitled to dismissal
of state criminal charges because he was not a member of a federally acknowledged
tribe); Phillips, 608 P.2d at 1135 (following federal cases in holding that the Due
Process Clause did not require the parole board to give reasons for removing in-
mate's name from its docket); Bruce v. Evertson, 68 P.2d 95, 97 (Okla. 1937) (modi-
fying prior ruling to yield to the judgment of the Tenth Circuit); Cellucci v. General
Motors Corp., 676 A.2d 253, 255 n.1 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (overruling two prior
cases in order to follow a Third Circuit decision, and noting that it is appropriate to
follow that court when it has spoken on a federal issue), affd, 706 A.2d 806 (Pa.
1998); York, 250 P.2d at 971 (following federal cases construing an executive order
as a declaration of public policy).
89. See, e.g., Bradley, 460 P.2d at 131-32 (distinguishing a Ninth Circuit case
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they should follow federal decisions when a number of federal
courts are in agreement. As the California Court of Appeal put
it, "[w]e should be hesitant to reject the authority of federal
decisions on questions of federal law where those decisions are
numerous and consistent."90 State courts also tend to be particu-
larly deferential when federal precedent is precisely on point9'
and when they wholeheartedly agree with a federal court on the
merits. 92
despite recognizing that federal precedent is "persuasive and entitled to. great
weight"); Yee, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 551-52 (declining to modify court's own prior ruling
on a constitutional issue in light of an intervening Ninth Circuit decision, finding
the federal court's reasoning "unpersuasive," even though federal decisions are "enti-
tled to substantial deference"); Delaney, 440 S.E.2d at 670 (stating that federal court
decisions are "highly respectable and persuasive authority," but distinguishing a
harmful jury charge in a Fifth Circuit case from the charge in the instant case);
People ex rel. Ray v. Martin, 60 N.E.2d 541, 547 (N.Y. 1945) (giving "due and great
respect" to federal court constructions of federal statutes, but "feel[ing] constrained to
make [its] own independent decision" in the instant case), aftd, 326 U.S. 496 (1946).
90. Conrad, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 347; see also Wimberly v. Labor & Indus. Rela-
tions Comm'n, 688 S.W.2d 344, 347-48 (Mo. 1985) ("In some circumstances it may be
appropriate for a state court to defer to long established and widely accepted federal
court interpretations of federal statutes."), affd on the merits, 476 U.S. 511 (1987);
Cherry Hill Township v. Oxford House, Inc., 621 A.2d 952, 966 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App.
Div. 1993) (adhering to the interpretation of a federal statute reached in three feder-
al cases); Shaw v. PACC Health Plan, Inc., 908 P.2d 308, 314 n.8 (Or. 1995) ("When
the federal courts are well-settled on a specific interpretation, this court may choose
to follow that interpretation."'); Maritime Overseas Corp. v. Ellis, 886 S.W.2d 780,
798 (Tex. App. 1994) (finding "no such division of opinion" among federal courts on
issue of prejudgment interest in Jones Act cases, and following the numerous deci-
sions of the Fifth Circuit), affd on the merits, 971 S.W.2d 402 (Tex. 1998). But see
Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 577 A.2d 1239, 1245-47 (N.J. 1990) (rejecting
uniform holding of five federal circuits that the Federal Cigarette Labeling & Adver-
tising Act preempts common-law remedies).
91. See, e.g., Sebastian, 701 A.2d at 27 ("Because [a Ninth Circuit decision] is
the only federal precedent that is precisely on point, its holding, although not bind-
ing on us, is entitled to significant weight."); Abdur-Ra'oof v. Department of Correc-
tions, 562 N.W.2d 251, 253 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997) ("In the present case, where [the
Sixth Circuit decision] involved . . . the same Department of Corrections, the same
religion, and the same challenged policy, we consider the ruling highly persuasive
and deserving of great deference."); Cellucci, 676 A.2d at 255 n.1 ("Because [a Third
Circuit case] involves the identical question raised here, we find its holding to be
particularly compelling.").
92. See, e.g., Lomax v. Fiedler, 554 N.W.2d 841, 849 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996) (fol-
lowing Martin v. Rison, 741 F. Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal. 1990), and stating that "we
have not hesitated to adopt the reasoning of federal lower-court decisions that we
consider persuasive on a particular question. We think Martin is such a case." (cita-
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Many state courts, by contrast, are much less effusive about
their respect for lower federal court decisions. Many of these
courts treat such decisions as merely persuasive. 3 Thus, if state
courts go along with federal decisions, it "is the product of sub-
stantive agreement on the merits rather than perfunctory defer-
ence."94 Many courts simply say that federal decisions are enti-
tled to "respect."95 Use of this word generally signals that federal
precedent will not be followed.96 Sometimes state courts abandon
any pretense of deference to the lower federal courts. When
federal precedent is cited, these courts brusquely state that they
are "not bound,"9" or vehemently disagree on the merits.98 For
tions omitted)); Streff v. Town of Delafield, 526 N.W.2d 822, 825 (Wis. Ct. App.
1994) (following Ninth Circuit decision applying ripeness doctrine to takings claim
because "[tihe ripeness requirement serves an important public policy consideration").
93. See, e.g., In re Tyrell, 876 P.2d 519, 524 (Cal. 1994) ("persuasive but not
controlling"); Rohr Aircraft Co. v. County of San Diego, 336 P.2d 521, 524 (Cal.
1959) ("merely persuasive"), rev'd on other grounds, 362 U.S. 628 (1960); People v.
Stansberry, 268 N.E.2d 431, 433 (Ill. 1971) ("no more than persuasive"); Shell Oil
Co. v. Secretary, Revenue & Taxation, 683 So. 2d 1204, 1210 n.11 (La. 1996) ("per-
suasive only"); State v. Strickland, 683 So. 2d 218, 230 (La. 1996) ("no more than
persuasive authority"); Chiropractic Nutritional Assocs. v. Empire Blue Cross and
Blue Shield, 669 A.2d 975, 980 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) ("persuasive authority"); Derby
v. Brenner Tank, Inc., 522 N.W.2d 274, 276 n.4 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994) ("[W]e may
adopt federal court decisions we find persuasive.").
94. Indiana Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Payne, 622 N.E.2d 461, 468 (Ind. 1993); see
also Shaw, 908 P.2d at 314 n.8 ("[T]his court may choose to follow [federal court
precedent] if the underlying reasoning is persuasive."); Barstow v. State, 742 S.W.2d
495, 501 (Tex. App. 1987) (stating that a federal decision "is as persuasive as its
logic").
95. See, e.g., Dugas v. State, 277 A.2d 620, 621 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1971) ('enti-
tled to respect"); Brown v. Palmer Clay Prods. Co., 195 N.E. 122, 123 (Mass. 1935)
("[rlespectful consideration"), affd, 297 U.S. 227 (1936); Hanch v. K.F.C. Nat'l Man-
agement Corp., 615 S.W.2d 28, 33 (Mo. 1981) (stating that the court "look[s] respect-
fully to such opinions for such aid and guidance as may be found therein").
96. See, e.g., Dugas, 277 A.2d at 167; Brown, 195 N.E. at 123.
97. See, e.g., Seibold v. State, 253 So. 2d 302, 309 (Ala. 1970) ("It is well settled
that the decisions of federal courts other than the Supreme Court are not binding
on a state court of last resort."); Lamb v. Railway Express Agency, 320 P.2d 644,
646 (Wash. 1958) ("We have held that [federal circuit court] decisions are not bind-
ing on us in Washington."). In City of Chicago v. Groffman, 368 N.E.2d 891 (Ill.
1977), the Illinois Supreme Court pointedly ignored lower federal court precedent in
ruling on the constitutionality of a Chicago ordinance. The court ultimately agreed
with a Seventh Circuit decision holding the ordinance unconstitutional, but was de-
termined to "consider the issue independent of the decisions of the Federal courts."
Id. at 894.
98. See, e.g., Central Bank, Nat'l Ass'n v. Superior Court, 106 Cal. Rptr. 912,
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example, in brushing aside a Ninth Circuit case that conflicted
with its own previous case law, the Alaska Supreme Court made
clear that it considers itself every bit the equal of the lower
federal courts:
Where a federal question is involved, the courts of Alaska are
not bound by the decisions of a federal court other than the
United States Supreme Court. The converse is also true; fed-
eral courts in Alaska are not bound by decisions of Alaska
state courts on questions of federal law.99
Similarly, in People v. Memro' the California Supreme Court
seemed to relish disregarding two federal circuit court decisions:
"Federal circuit court opinions do not bind us. They may serve
as persuasive authority, of course, but only when they are just
that-persuasive. Having carefully considered the reasoning of
both opinions, we find that neither one is so." '°1
Last, but not least, some state courts follow the approach for
ascertaining federal law that is suggested in this Article: they
attempt to decide the federal question the way they believe the
Supreme Court would decide it. Only a few courts explicitly
915 (Ct. App. 1973) (-In our view [a federal circuit decision] and its progeny read
the statute erroneously, ignore the realities of modern commercial practices and vio-
late congressional intent."); Strickland, 683 So. 2d at 230 (stating that a Fifth Cir-
cuit case "fails entirely to persuade"); Kraus v. Board of Educ., 492 S.W.2d 783, 786
(Mo. 1973) ("It would serve no useful or proper purpose for us to comment on the
holding in [an Eighth Circuit] case. It is enough to say . .. that we do not agree
with it .... ").
99. In re F.P., W.M., & A.M., 843 P.2d 1214, 1215 n.1 (Alaska 1992).
100. 905 P.2d 1305 (Cal. 1995).
101. Id. at 1359 (citations omitted). While some courts may relish rejecting federal
cases, other courts appear uneasy about it. Often when state courts claim that they
are not bound by federal decisions, they buttress their position by finding some addi-
tional reason for rejecting the federal precedent. For example, a state court may dis-
tinguish a federal decision on its facts. See, e.g., People v. Bradley, 460 P.2d 129,
132 (Cal. 1969); Delaney v. Lakeside Villa, Ltd., 440 S.E.2d 668, 670 (Ga. Ct. App.
1993); Bartholomey v. State, 273 A.2d 164, 173 (Md. 1971), vacated in part, 408
U.S. 938 (1972); State v. Kelly, 753 S.W.2d 71, 73 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988). It also may
find the federal claim to be waived by a procedural default. See, e.g., State v.
Crenshaw, 852 S.W.2d 181, 187 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (holding a Sixth Circuit case
"inapposite in that the claim of error there was preserved by timely objection at
trial" and also not binding on state court). A state court also may decide that the
lower federal court decision did not announce a new constitutional principle. See,
e.g., Futrell v. State, 667 S.W.2d 404, 407 (Mo. 1984).
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state that they are using this approach. In La Bonte v. New
York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Co.,1"2 a Federal Employ-
ers' Liability Act (FELA) case, the plaintiff claimed that the de-
fendant was estopped from asserting a three-year statute of lim-
itations 0 3 The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts stated:
There appear to be no decisions of the [U.S.] Supreme Court
that shed any light on estoppel in FELA cases, and not very
much law has thus far been developed by the lower Federal
courts.... Since the Supreme Court has not spoken on this
subject, we are obliged to decide the question as we think
that court would decide it.
10 4
When deciding issues of federal law, the Texas Supreme Court
visualizes itself as an intermediate appellate court that must
anticipate how the Supreme Court would rule. The court recog-
nized its unusual position in City of Lancaster v. Chambers:°5
"When deciding issues of federal law, we find ourselves in the
unique role-as a court of last resort on all other issues within
our jurisdiction-of an intermediate appellate court, anticipating
the manner in which the United States Supreme Court would
decide the issue presented." °6 The Vermont Supreme Court
adopted a similar perspective for issues of federal law in State v.
Hamlin:'1° "[Iun reviewing a claim of error under the Fifth
Amendment we place ourselves in the position of a federal court
of appeals."'0 8 Accordingly, the court believed it should "analyze
the alleged error in light of the relevant decisions of the United
States Supreme Court.""9
These courts, however, only hint at exactly how they go about
determining what the Supreme Court would do when there is no
precedent on point. In Paddock v. Siemoneit,"° the Texas Su-
preme Court tried to determine the meaning of the applicable
102. 167 N.E.2d 629 (Mass. 1960).
103. See id. at 631-32.
104. Id. at 632.
105. 883 S.W.2d 650 (Tex. 1994).
106. Id. at 658-59.
107. 499 A.2d 45 (Vt. 1985).
108. Id. at 49.
109. Id.
110. 218 S.W.2d 428 (Tex. 1949).
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federal statute from Supreme Court opinions "in more or less
analogous cases.""' In Hamlin, the Vermont Supreme Court
looked to federal circuit court cases,1 2 and in La Bonte, the Mas-
sachusetts high court looked to "such lower Federal Court deci-
sions as seem persuasive," as well as to its own prior deci-
sions.1 3
A larger number of courts appear to be trying to determine
how the Supreme Court would decide the issue without explicit-
ly stating that they are engaged in such an analysis." 4 Some-
times state courts refuse to follow a lower federal court decision
because they believe the federal decision misreads or is inconsis-
tent with Supreme Court precedent."5 Seemingly, then, these
courts are attempting to decide the case the way they believe
the Supreme Court would decide it. For example, in Stallworth
v. City of Evergreen,"6 the plaintiff claimed he was denied due
process when fired from his job."7 Despite the plaintiff's blatant-
ly unfair pretermination hearing,118 the trial court relied on a
recent Eleventh Circuit case holding that any procedural defi-
ciencies in pretermination hearings could be remedied by an
111. Id. at 434.
112. See Hamlin, 499 A.2d at 50.
113. LaBonte v. New York, New Haven, & Hartford R.R., 167 N.E.2d 629, 632
(Mass. 1960).
114. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Groffman, 368 N.E.2d 891, 894-96 (Ill. 1977)
(holding a Chicago ordinance unconstitutional and supporting its decision with an
extensive discussion of Supreme Court cases); Flanagan v. Prudential-Bache Sec.,
Inc., 495 N.E.2d 345, 347-49 (N.Y. 1986) (finding a split in the lower federal courts
and turning to Supreme Court cases for guidance).
115. See, e.g., Yee v. City of Escondido, 274 Cal. Rptr. 551, 552-56 (Ct. App.
1990) (refusing to follow a recent Ninth Circuit decision because the court thought
an even more recent decision of the Supreme Court undercut that decision), aff'd on
the merits, 503 U.S. 519 (1992); Bradshaw v. State, 286 So. 2d 4, 6-7 (Fla. 1973)
(refusing to follow federal district court decision holding a disorderly conduct statute
unconstitutional because the court did not think the Supreme Court would agree
with district court holding); State v. Harmon, 685 P.2d 814, 817-19 (Idaho 1984) (de-
clining to follow a federal district court decision holding state criminal statute void
for vagueness because the court thought the statute was constitutional under exist-
ing Supreme Court precedent).
116. 680 So. 2d 229 (Ala. 1996).
117. See id. at 233.
118. See id. The hearing officer was plaintiffs supervisor and the person who had
initiated the complaint. See id Moreover, the hearing officer was a material witness
at the hearing. See id.
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adequate post-termination hearing, and denied relief."9 The Ala-
bama Supreme Court thought the Eleventh Circuit improperly
relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Parratt v. Taylor"2 ° in
reaching this conclusion.' 2 ' In Parratt, the Supreme Court held
that a state prisoner did not have a due process right to a hear-
ing before prison officials negligently lost his property.'22 Given
that a predeprivation hearing is plainly impossible in such cir-
cumstances, the prisoner was entitled only to a postdeprivation
remedy in state court.'23 Unlike in Parratt, however, Stallworth
could be afforded meaningful pretermination proceedings. 124 In-
stead of following Parratt, the Alabama Supreme Court chose to
follow the Supreme Court decision in Cleveland Board of Educa-
tion v. Loudermill,2 5 which recognized that pretermination hear-
ings were practicable in the employment context.126 The Ala-
bama Supreme Court went on to conclude that a post-termina-
tion hearing could not remedy the constitutional defects in
Stallworth's pretermination hearing. 27 In sum, the Alabama
Supreme Court appeared to be attempting to ascertain how the
Supreme Court would decide the case, although it never specifi-
cally said it was following this approach.
28
C. Federal Court Opinions on the Issue
All-in-all, the state courts follow an extraordinarily wide
range of conflicting and inconsistent rules for ascertaining federal
119. See id. at 234 (citing McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550 (11th Cir. 1994)).
120. 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
121. See Stallworth, 680 So. 2d at 234-35.
122. See Parratt, 451 U.S. at 543-44.
123. See id. at 538-43.
124. See Stallworth, 680 So. 2d at 233-34 (suggesting that an unbiased and im-
partial decisionmaker could have cured Stallworth's problems prior to his termina-
tion).
125. 470 U.S. 532 (1985).
126. See id. at 547-48.
127. See Stallworth, 680 So. 2d at 235.
128. Cf Blanton v. North Las Vegas Mun. Court, 748 P.2d 494, 500 (Nev. 1987),
affd on the merits by Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538 (1989) (de-
clining to follow a federal district court decision mandating jury trials in Nevada
"driving under the influence" cases because the court thought the federal decision
was "an unnecessary and unwarranted expansion" of Supreme Court precedent).
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law. Federal courts have relatively little opportunity to advise
the state courts as to how they should proceed.'29 When federal
courts do speak, it is often as an aside or in dictum.13 0 The feder-
al courts agree that state courts are bound by Supreme Court
decisions interpreting federal law.' Early in our history, the
Supreme Court said that "the construction given by this Court to
the constitution and laws of the United States is received by all
as the true construction," 32 and the Court often has reaffirmed
that rule.
133
The federal courts disagree, however, as to the effect that
state courts should give to lower federal court decisions when
the Supreme Court has not spoken." On at least two occasions,
the Supreme Court suggested that state courts are bound by
lower federal court constructions of the FELA. In Southern
Railway Co. v. Gray,"5 the Court said: "As the action is under
the Federal Employers' Liability Act, rights and obligations de-
pend upon it and applicable principles of common law as inter-
129. See United States ex rel. Lawrence v. Woods, 432 F.2d 1072, 1076 (7th Cir.
1970).
130. In 1970, Chief Judge Swygert of the Seventh Circuit stated he could not find
any federal court decisions dealing directly with the effect that lower federal court
decisions should be given in state court. See id. at 1075.
131. See, e.g., id. at 1075-76.
132. Elmendorf v. Taylor, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 152, 160 (1825).
133. See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) ("[T]he interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment enunciated by this Court in the Brown case is the supreme
law of the land . . . [and] of binding effect on the States."); Chesapeake & Ohio Ry.
Co. v. Kuhn, 284 U.S. 44, 47 (1931). In Kuhn, the Court wrote that the Ohio inter-
mediate appellate court
acted upon the erroneous theory that it should follow the views of the
Supreme Court of the State rather than those of this Court in respect of
questions arising under the [Federal Employers'] Liability Act. That stat-
ute, as interpreted by this Court, is the supreme law to be applied by all
courts, federal and state.
Kuhn, 284 U.S. at 47.
Lower federal courts also have affirmed that state courts are bound by Supreme
Court decisions. See, e.g., Lawrence, 432 F.2d at 1075-76 (affirming that Supreme
Court decisions "on national law have binding effect on all lower courts whether
state or federal"); Owsley v. Peyton, 352 F.2d 804, 805 (4th Cir. 1965) (asserting
that "Supreme Court decisions . . . are necessarily binding upon the states").
134. See Lawrence, 432 F.2d at 1075-76.
135. 241 U.S. 333 (1916).
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preted and applied in Federal courts."'36 Similarly, in Urie v.
Thompson,' the Court stated that the statute
does not define negligence, leaving that question to be deter-
mined, as the Missouri Supreme Court said, "by the common
law principles as established and applied in the federal
courts.".. . What constitutes negligence for the statute's pur-
poses is a federal question, not varying in accordance with
the differing conceptions of negligence applicable under state
and local laws for other purposes. Federal decisional law for-
mulating and applying the concept governs.
38
One can argue that these decisions require state courts to follow
lower federal court decisions interpreting federal law. The
Court's language seems quite clear. State courts are to follow
federal law "as interpreted and applied in Federal courts"" 9 and
"[flederal decisional law... governs." 4 ' If the Court had meant
to make only Supreme Court precedent binding, it would have
said so.
On the other hand, Gray and Urie probably should not be con-
sidered determinative. In both cases, the Court's primary point
was that federal rather than state law should govern.' The ref-
erence to federal case law is contained in one or two sentences,
and neither opinion explicitly addresses the distinction between
Supreme Court and lower federal court precedent. Moreover, in
both cases, the decisions the Supreme Court cited as authority
did not support the proposition that state courts are bound by
lower federal court decisions interpreting federal law. Finally,
the Supreme Court has not subsequently relied upon Gray or
Urie to support this proposition. Several individual Supreme
Court Justices have stated instead that state courts are not
bound by lower federal court decisions. 4 '
136. Id. at 338-39.
137. 337 U.S. 163 (1949).
138. Id. at 174 (citations omitted).
139. Gray, 241 U.S. at 338-39.
140. Urie, 333 U.S. at 174.
141. See Gray, 241 U.S. at 338-39; Urie, 337 U.S. at 165.
142. See Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 376 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring)
("The Supremacy Clause demands that state law yield to federal law, but neither
federal supremacy nor any other principle of federal law requires that a state court's
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The lower federal courts are split regarding whether state
courts are bound by lower federal court decisions interpreting
federal law. In United States ex rel. Lawrence v. Woods,14 the
Seventh Circuit opted for "not bound": "Until the Supreme Court
of the United States has spoken, state courts are not precluded
from exercising their own judgment upon questions of federal
law. They are not concluded by, though they should give respect-
ful consideration to, the decisions of the federal Circuit Courts of
Appeals and District Courts."' The Ninth Circuit, by contrast,
has expressed "serious doubts as to the wisdom of this view...
[which] could lead to considerable friction between the state and
federal courts." 45
interpretation of federal law give way to a (lower) federal court's interpretation.");
Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 482 n.3 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) ("Al-
though [a] state court would not be compelled [by stare decisis] to follow [a] federal
holding, the opinion might, of course, be viewed as highly persuasive.").
143. 432 F.2d 1072 (7th Cir. 1970).
144. Id. at 1075 (quoting Iowa Nat. Bank v. Stewart, 232 N.W. 445, 454 (Iowa
1930), rev'd by Iowa-Des Moines Nat'l Bank v. Bennett, 284 U.S. 239 (1931). Other
circuits have reached similar conclusions. See Bromley v. Crisp, 561 F.2d 1351, 1354
(10th Cir. 1977) ("We agree . . . that the Oklahoma Courts may express their differ-
ing views on . .. federal questions until we are all guided by a binding decision of
the Supreme Court."); Owsley v. Peyton, 352 F.2d 804, 805 (4th Cir. 1965) ("Though
state courts may for policy reasons follow the decisions of the Court of Appeals
whose circuit includes their state . . . they are not obliged to do so.").
145. Yniguez v. Arizona, 939 F.2d 727, 736 (9th Cir. 1991). Other circuits have
reached similar conclusions. See Fretwell v. Lockhart, 946 F.2d 571, 577 (8th Cir.
1991), rev'd on other grounds, 506 U.S. 364 (1993) (presuming that the Arkansas tri-
al court would follow an Eighth Circuit decision because state courts are bound by
the Supremacy Clause). Babbitz v. McCann, 320 F. Supp. 219 (E.D. Wis. 1970), va-
cated, 402 U.S. 903 (1971), demonstrates the sort of friction that can arise. In
Babbitz, a three-judge district court declared portions of Wisconsin's abortion statute
unconstitutional. See id. at 293. The court did not issue an injunction, relying on
state authorities to stop enforcing the statute based on comity. See id. at 221. The
state authorities, however, promptly made clear that they would only honor a deci-
sion by the Supreme Court. See id. at 221-22. An angry three-judge court then is-
sued an injunction. See id. at 223. Although the court realized that "it is arguable
that our judgment may not be literally 'binding' on the state," id. (citing United
States ex rel Lawrence v. Woods, 432 F.2d 1072 (7th Cir. 1970)), the court was up-
set that "[i]n the case at bar, comity has proved to be a one-way street." Id. at 222.
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D. Underlying Policy Reasons
Very few courts, state or federal, give any reasons for the po-
sition they take. When courts do give reasons, such rationales
generally are conclusory.' The few courts that explain why Su-
preme Court decisions are binding on state courts point to the
Supremacy Clause'47 and to the Supreme Court's power to re-
view federal issues in state court decisions.'48 As Lawrence sug-
gests, "[tihe Supreme Court of the United States has appellate
jurisdiction over federal questions arising either in state or fed-
eral proceedings, and by reason of the supremacy clause the
decisions of that court on national law have binding effect on all
lower courts whether state or federal." 49
State courts holding themselves bound by lower federal court
interpretations of federal statutes may do so by analogy to the
traditional federal court practice of following state court inter-
pretations of state statutes. In 1825, the Supreme Court noted
that there is a "principle, supposed to be universally recognized,
that the judicial department of every government, where such
department exists, is the appropriate organ for construing the
legislative acts of that government." 5 ° The Court cited this max-
im in relying upon state court decisions construing a Kentucky
statute,'5 ' and, of course, Swift v. Tyson 152 read it into section 34
of the Judiciary Act of 1789113 by requiring the federal courts to
146. See, e.g., supra notes 95-101 and accompanying text.
147. See Lockhart, 506 U.S. at 376.
148. See Lawrence, 432 F.2d at 1075-76.
149. Id.; see also Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) ("[Tlhe interpretation of
the Fourteenth Amendment enunciated by this Court in the Brown case is the su-
preme law of the land, and Art. VI of the Constitution makes it of binding effect on
the States."). In Barstow v. State, 742 S.W.2d 495 (Tex. App. 1987), the Texas Court
of Appeals stated that the duty to obey the Supreme Court results from the princi-
ple that "a court's construction of a statute becomes an integral part of the statute
itself," and from the Supremacy Clause, which makes the laws of the United States
the "supreme law of the land" binding on "the Judges in every State." Id. at 501
n.2. The New Jersey Supreme Court put it more simply: "[T]o disregard or evade
the decisions of the Supreme Court . . . would indeed disserve the interests of our
country." Schlemm v. Schlemm, 158 A.2d 508, 516 (N.J. 1960).
150. Elmendorf v. Taylor, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 152, 159 (1825).
151. See id. at 160.
152. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
153. Ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (1789).
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follow "state laws, strictly local, that is to say ... the positive
statutes of the state, and the construction thereof adopted by the
local tribunals."" In holding themselves bound by lower federal
court constructions of federal statutes, state judges may simply
be following the converse of this long-established practice in the
federal courts. Only one state court decision, however, could be
found that expressed this rationale.
155
Courts that give reasons why they should not be bound by
lower federal court decisions make both structural and practical
arguments. These courts base the structural argument -on the
institutional framework chosen by the Founding Fathers:156 Low-
er federal courts and state courts exist side-by-side; both sets of
courts can decide federal questions. Although both are subject to
Supreme Court review, they do not sit in review of each other.
Consequently, state courts are not bound by lower federal court
decisions on issues of federal law. 5' Some courts suggest that
154. Swift, 41 U.S. at 18.
155. See Jones v. Erie R.R., 140 N.E. 366, 367-68 (Ohio 1922). As the Jones court
stated:
The federal courts in all cases involving the construction of state statutes
have uniformly followed the rule that the construction given to such stat-
utes in the state of their enactment shall control, and this court has al-
ways with equal deference followed the constructions of federal statutes
which have been made by federal courts.
Id. One federal court suggests that, having chosen to create lower federal courts,
Congress may have intended that these lower federal courts have the final word on
the meaning of federal law. See Yniguez v. Arizona, 939 F.2d 727, 736 (9th Cir.
1991); see also HOLT, supra note 16, at 160 (juxtaposing duty of federal courts to
follow construction of state statutes by state courts and duty of state courts to fol-
low construction of federal statutes by federal courts).
156. See supra notes 10-15 and accompanying text.
157. See, e.g., People v. Barber, 799 P.2d 936, 940 (Colo. 1990) ("Lower federal
courts do not have appellate jurisdiction over state courts and their decisions are not
conclusive on state courts, even on questions of federal law."); Iowa Nat. Bank v.
Stdwart, 232 N.W. 445, 454 (Iowa 1930) (stating that lower federal and state courts
are, 'as to the laws of the United States, co-ordinate courts" and that "[fiinality of
determination in respect to the laws of the United States rests in the Supreme
Court"), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Iowa-Des Moines Nat'l Bank v. Bennett,
284 U.S. 239 (1931); Barstow v. State, 742 S.W.2d 495, 500 n.2 (Tex. App. 1987). As
the court in Barstow wrote:
Congress limited [federal court of appeals] jurisdiction to appeals taken
from the final decisions of federal district courts.... Consequently, the
decisions of one federal Court of Appeals on a question of law do not
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state courts have an independent responsibility to interpret fed-
eral law. As the New Jersey Supreme Court stated in State v.
Coleman:'58
In passing on federal constitutional questions, the state
courts and the lower federal courts have the same responsi-
bility and occupy the same position; there is parallelism but
not paramountcy for both sets of courts are governed by the
same reviewing authority of the Supreme Court.
... [If we were to follow the federal court decision] we
would be... abdicating our undoubted responsibility to pass
on issues of constitutionality and justice as we see them.'59
Courts base the practical argument on the fact that the lower
federal courts often disagree on the meaning of federal law. Ob-
viously, a state court cannot follow two conflicting opinions.
160
Some state courts give a similar reason in explaining why they
do not grant their own circuit particular deference when other
circuits disagree. No federal decision is definitive, and their own
circuit may be wrong. 6'
bind any other federal Court of Appeals under the doctrine of stare deci-
sis. Nor do they bind any Texas court, even on federal questions ....
Id. Several scholars agree with this reasoning. See, e.g., Caminker, supra note 6, at
825 ("But the state and territorial judges are not bound by precedents established by
courts that do not have the authority to review those judges' decisions.. . . Thus a
state court need not follow the holdings of any inferior federal court."); Shapiro, su-
pra note 6, at 771 ("[It seems . . . plain that [lower federal court] precedent would
not be binding as a matter of federal supremacy on an issue of federal law....
[Only the Supreme Court sits atop the state courts in the national hierarchy. Other
federal courts are no more than coordinate .... "); Note, supra note 6, at 946.
158. 214 A.2d 393 (N.J. 1965).
159. Id. at 403-04; see also People v. Del Vecchio, 544 N.E.2d 312, 327 (Ill. 1989)
("In passing on Federal constitutional questions, State courts and lower Federal
courts have the same responsibility."); Flanagan v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 495
N.E.2d 345, 348 (N.Y. 1986) (recognizing that a state court "has the same responsi-
bility as the lower Federal courts and is not precluded from exercising its own judg-
ment" when there is no uniformity in the decisions of the lower federal courts);
Schwarzer et al., supra note 6, at 1747 (arguing that by ceding interpretation of fed-
eral law to a federal court, "the state court would appear to be abdicating its re-
sponsibility to the litigants 1 efore it").
160. See People v. Stansberry, 268 N.E.2d 431, 433 (Ill. 1971) (stating that when
lower federal courts disagree, "there can be no definitive ruling by which a State
court can be bound").
161. In Amerada Hess Corp. v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass, 627 So. 2d 367 (Ala.
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State courts give several reasons for following lower federal
decisions, whether they consider themselves technically bound or
not. They wish to avoid forum shopping between state and feder-
al courts 16 2 and to maintain good relations with the federal
courts.163 They also seek to reduce confusion in the administra-
tion of justice,1' guarantee judicial certainty,165 and help insure
the uniformity of federal law.
166
Some state courts believe that these reasons for following low-
er federal court decisions have particular force when a defendant
1993), the Alabama Supreme Court refused to follow an Eleventh Circuit ruling that
was inconsistent with case law from several other circuits even though forum shop-
ping might result. See id. at 372. The court stated that "our concern over the po-
tentiality of forum shopping is insuffcient to override our reluctance to follow an ap-
proach that, in this Court's view, is inconsistent with the principles of maritime law
and has no support among the rest of the federal circuits that have addressed this
issue." Id. at 372-73.
State courts give federal district court decisions less weight than circuit court
decisions because a district court decision is not binding on other federal district
courts, see Barber, 799 P.2d at 940 n.3, or even on the same judge in a later case,
see Yniguez v. Arizona, 939 F.2d 727, 736-37 (9th Cir. 1991).
162. See, e.g., Amerada Hess Corp., 627 So. 2d at 372-73 ("We share ... [the]
concern over the potentiality of forum shopping . . . ."); Red Maple Properties v.
Zoning Comm'n, 610 A.2d 1238, 1242 n.7 (Conn. 1992) ("We do not believe that
when Congress enacted the concurrent jurisdiction provision of § 1983 that it intend-
ed to create such a disparate treatment of plaintiffs depending on their choice of a
federal or state forum."); Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 577 A.2d 1239, 1244
(N.J. 1990) ("[Llower federal-court decisions ... should be accorded due respect . . .
[because] judicial comity discourages forum shopping.").
163. See, e.g., State v. Lafferty, 309 A.2d 647, 667 (Me. 1973) (Wernick, J., con-
curring) (stating that it is a "wise policy" to accept federal constitutional rulings of
the circuit court in which the state is situated "in the interests of developing harmo-
nious federal-state relationships").
164. See, e.g., Franklin v. State, 285 A.2d 616, 617 (Md. 1972) (stating that ren-
dering a decision contrary to that of the federal courts would "simply add to the
confusion"); Bruce v. Evertson, 68 P.2d 95, 97 (Okla. 1937) ("[Iun the interest of a
harmonious administration of the law, we are prone to yield to the judgment of [the]
Circuit Court of Appeals.").
165. See Cherry Hill Township v. Oxford House, 621 A.2d 952, 966 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1993) (holding that lower federal court decisions must be accorded due
respect to "guarantee judicial certainty").
166. See id; see also Dewey, 577 A.2d at 1244 (noting importance of uniformity
between state courts and lower federal courts); State v. Austin, 685 A.2d 1076, 1080
(Vt. 1996) (same). In all of the opinions I have read, only one mentions the greater
expertise of federal courts in interpreting federal law as a reason to defer to lower
federal court decisions. See Emmens v. Johnson, 923 S.W.2d 705, 709 (Tex. App.
1996).
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can seek federal habeas corpus review of a state conviction.16" 7 As
a practical matter, the lower federal courts exercise appellate
jurisdiction over the state courts in such cases.168 Thus, if the
state courts refuse to acquiesce in federal court decisions, a
defendant can obtain relief in federal court. This frustrates state
judges, annoys federal judges, and creates more work for every-
one. As the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania explained in Com-
monwealth v. Negri, in discussing recent Third Circuit case law
at odds with Pennsylvania precedent:
Obviously, [these] decision[s] creat[e] a serious problem for
this Court, and jeopardiz[e] the finality of our judgments in
relevant cases.... [Tihe decision of the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals is on this matter, for all practical purposes, the
ultimate forum in Pennsylvania. If [we] refuse to abide by its
conclusions, then the individual to whom we deny relief need
only to "walk across the street" to gain a different result.
Such an unfortunate situation would cause disrespect for the
law. It would also result in adding to the already burdensome
problems of the Commonwealth's trial courts, which look to
us for guidance. Finality of judgments would become illusory,
disposition of litigation prolonged for years, the business of
the courts unnecessarily clogged, and justice intolerably de-
layed and frequently denied.169
It is thus no wonder that the Negri court decided to go along
with Third Circuit case law until the Supreme Court resolved
the dispute. 70
167. See Commonwealth v. Masskow, 290 N.E.2d 154, 157 (Mass. 1972).
168. See Barry Friedman, A Tale of Two Habeas, 73 MINN. L. REV. 247, 254
(1988) (asserting that "through habeas review," the lower federal courts "were to act
as surrogates for the United States Supreme Court... in effect, exercising appel-
late jurisdiction over state criminal proceedings"); Evan Tsen Lee, Section 2254(d) of
the New Habeas Statute: An (Opinionated) User's Manual, 51 VAND. L. REV. 103, 107
(1998) (stating that federal courts, by hearing habeas cases, have acted as appellate
courts "for at least forty years").
169. Commonwealth v. Negri, 213 A.2d 670, 672 (Pa. 1965); see also Masskow,
290 N.E.2d at 157 ("It would be undesirable for us to affirm the conviction of a
defendant if the inevitable consequence were that he would be released on a writ of
habeas corpus.").
170. See Negri, 213 A.2d at 672.
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II. A Proposed Standard for Ascertaining Federal Law
State courts use diverse and conflicting standards for ascer-
taining federal law when there is no Supreme Court precedent
directly on point. This Article proposes that state courts adopt a
single standard that is analogous to the rule the federal courts
follow for ascertaining state law. State courts should decide fed-
eral questions the way they believe the Supreme Court would
decide them. Part II begins by examining whether there is any-
thing in the Constitution or in historical practice that mandates
a particular approach, and concludes that, within reason, state
courts are free to choose whatever standard they wish. It then
identifies and discusses the goals the standards should seek to
further, and finally explains why the proposed approach would
best achieve those goals.
A. Constitutional and Historical Considerations
Neither the Constitution nor history requires or precludes any
particular approach to ascertaining federal law. The Constitu-
tion does not directly address the issue. The Supremacy Clause
bears most closely on the matter, and states that "[tihis Consti-
tution, and the Laws of the United States... shall be the su-
preme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby."'71 Thus, the Supremacy Clause makes federal
law binding on the states in cases where federal law applies. 172
It does not, however, mandate any particular approach to ascer-
taining that law. Courts have held that the Supremacy Clause
requires state courts to follow Supreme Court decisions that
171. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
172. See Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 136 (1876) ("The laws of the United
States are laws in the several States, and just as much binding on the citizens and
courts thereof as the State laws are."); see also Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngs-
town R.R., 342 U.S. 359, 361-62 (1952) (noting the applicability of federal law in a
case involving FELA); Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239, 245 (1942)
(noting the applicability of federal law in a case involving admiralty law); McDonald
v. Pennsylvania R.R., 136 N.E. 894, 895 (Ohio 1922) (stating that "the law is settled
that when Congress acts upon [interstate commerce] all state laws are superseded
by reason of the supremacy of the national authority").
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interpret federal law. 7 3 It might be argued that the Supremacy
Clause also requires state courts to follow lower federal court
decisions when the Supreme Court has not spoken, but no au-
thority can be found for this proposition, even in state court de-
cisions holding state courts bound by lower federal court rulings.
Richard Matasar argues that the Supremacy Clause actually
requires the state courts to follow their own view of federal
law. 74 Although weighty arguments support the position that
state courts -are not bound by lower federal court decisions,' cit-
ing the Supremacy Clause in support of this position seems a bit
odd. The fairest reading is that the Supremacy Clause does not
require the states either to follow or to disregard lower federal
court decisions, 7 6 or to adopt any particular approach to ascer-
tain federal law.'77
Courts and commentators favoring a categorical "not bound"
rule often use a structural argument based on the institutional
framework chosen by the Founders to support their position. 
78
This argument has some force: because the Founders envisioned
a central and independent role for state courts in the implemen-
tation and enforcement of federal law-with no direct review by
the lower federal courts' 79-- one can infer that state courts
should not be bound by lower federal court decisions interpreting
federal law.
173. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
174. See Matasar, supra note 6, at 1422 n.94 ("The principle of stare decisis is
subordinate to the principle of the supremacy of federal law . . . under which the
state and lower federal courts are bound to follow their own view of what the feder-
al law means, in spite of conflicting decisions by other lower courts.").
175. See supra notes 156-61 and accompanying text.
176. See Caminker, supra note 6, at 837 (stating that neither the Supremacy
Clause nor any other constitutional provision "demands that state courts defer to a
particular actor's interpretation of federal law"); Shapiro, supra note 6, at 771 (as-
serting that lower federal court precedent is not binding on state courts as a matter
of federal supremacy).
177. The Supremacy Clause may impose some limits on state court discretion in
choosing standards. If a state court adopted an approach for ascertaining federal law
that seemed intentionally designed to ascertain federal law incorrectly or was merely
a subterfuge for ignoring federal law, the Supremacy Clause might preclude that
approach.
178. See supra notes 156-61 and accompanying text.
179. See supra text accompanying note 12.
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Although the argument from history has force, it is not ulti-
mately decisive. There is no indication that the Constitutional
Convention, the state ratification conventions, or the'First Con-
gress ever explicitly considered the issue this Article addresses.
In addition, it does not necessarily follow that just because the
Founders thought state courts should decide issues of federal
law if there were no lower federal courts or if jurisdiction were
not extended to those courts, they would also have thought that
state courts should ignore decisions of the lower federal courts
once they were created and empowered to decide the full range
of federal claims. As the Ninth Circuit argued in Yniguez v. Ari-
zona: "Having chosen to create the lower federal courts, Con-
gress may have intended that just as state courts have the final
word on questions of state law, the federal courts ought to have
the final word on questions of federal law."'
Finally, there are exceptions to the basic rule of stare decisis
that a court is bound to follow only those courts that can directly
reverse it.' 8 ' For example, under Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins 8 2 and its progeny, federal courts are bound to follow
state law as announced by the highest state court in cases in
which it applies'83 even though federal decisions on the meaning
of state law are not directly reviewable by the state courts.
B. Goals that the Standards Should Seek to Further
Assuming that the state courts are free to choose standards
for ascertaining federal law, what standards should they use?
The standards they choose should further two interrelated goals.
First, the standards should help state courts correctly interpret
federal law; second, they should help achieve national uniformi-
ty in the interpretation of federal law. The first goal seems self-
180. 939 F.2d 727, 736 (9th Cir. 1991).
181. See United States v. Mitlo, 714 F.2d 294, 298 (3d Cir. 1983) (stating that
higher court precedents are binding on courts lower in the judicial hierarchy).
182. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
183. See Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 464-65 (1967); Nolan v.
Transocean Air Lines, 365 U.S. 293, 295-96 (1961); McKenna v. Ortho Pharm. Corp.,
622 F.2d 657, 661 (3 d Cir. 1980).
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evident: when the Supremacy Clause requires state courts to
apply federal law, they should apply the correct federal law, not
some mistaken version. Simply put, standards for ascertaining
federal law ought to help state judges get it right.
The second goal is related to the first because the more
accurate judges are, the more uniform the law will be. Ideally,
federal law should be uniform because it is one government's
law."M State rules may vary, but federal law should mean the
same thing in Alabama as it does in Idaho. That is not to say
that federal law must be applied in exactly the same manner
everywhere. Local differences may justify different results in
particular cases, but, to the extent possible, the basic meaning of
federal law should be the same nationwide. Uniform interpreta-
tion of federal law furthers several important policies. First, it
promotes equal protection of the laws. Treating like cases alike
is basic to the American notion of fairness."8 5 Second, uniform
interpretation of law also promotes evenhanded, predictable,
consistent development of legal principles. People can plan bet-
ter, and can rely on the law with greater confidence. 8 6 Third,
uniform interpretation of law also discourages forum shopping.
Americans take instinctive offense when the outcome of litiga-
184. The Supreme Court has long recognized the importance of the uniform inter-
pretation of federal law. See, e.g., Taflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 465 (1990)
("[Pletitioners' concern with the need for uniformity and consistency of federal crim-
inal law is well taken . .. .); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363,
367 (1943) (stating that the use of diverse state laws governing federal commercial
paper "would subject the rights and duties of the United States to exceptional uncer-
tainty . .. [and] lead to great diversity in results . . . [thus making tihe desirability
of a uniform [federal] rule . .. plain"); Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 331,
350 (1855) (noting that the country "would be incomplete and altogether insufficient
for the great ends contemplated, unless a constitutional arbiter was provided to give
certainty and uniformity, in all of the States, to the interpretation of the constitu-
tion and the legislation of congress"); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.)
304, 347-48 (1816) (stating "the importance, and even necessity of uniformity of deci-
sions throughout the whole United States, upon all subjects within the purview of
the constitution").
185. See Caminker, supra note 6, at 852.
186. See Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 597 (1987) (arguing
that '[t]he ability to predict what a decisionmaker will do helps us plan our lives,
have some degree of repose, and avoid the paralysis of foreseeing only the un-
known").
1180
STANDARDS TO ASCERTAIN FEDERAL LAW
tion is determined by the court the plaintiff chooses rather than
the underlying merits of the case. 8'
Some writers contend that state courts should develop their
own, independent interpretations of federal law."8 ' This argu-
ment has some merit, provided that it is not carried too far.
For example, William W. Schwarzer, Nancy E. Weiss, and Alan
Hirsch point to "the value of fifty laboratories in which ap-
proaches to federal law can be tested."189 Professor Paul M.
Bator suggests that we "derive enormous benefits from having a
variety of institutional 'sets' within which issues of federal con-
stitutional law are addressed."19 Professors Robert Cover and
Alexander Aleinikoff argue that both federal and local perspec-
tives are particularly important in the criminal justice system. 9'
Federal judges often have a more utopian perspective because
they view the state criminal process in habeas corpus proceed-
ings, which involve only substantial constitutional claims. State
judges, by contrast, often are much more aware of the enormous
practical problems in the day-to-day administration of state
criminal justice. Thus, they realize how difficult it may be to
implement new constitutional rulings.
92
To the extent that these writers suggest a cooperative feder-
alism in which both state and federal judges participate in a
mutual endeavor to interpret and apply federal law, I have no
argument. State judges are entitled to an opportunity to say
what federal law should be, within accepted bounds constraining
judges in such an endeavor. 9 ' Put another way, they are enti-
tled to assert their opinion as to what the "right" interpretation
is without constantly having to look over their shoulders. There
187. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky & Barry Friedman, The Fragmentation of Fed-
eral Rules, 46 MERCER L. REV. 757, 782-83 (1995) (providing reasons to dislike forum
shopping).
188. See Schwarzer et al., supra note 6, at 1746.
189. Id.
190. Paul M. Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22
WM. & MARY L. REV. 605, 634 (1981).
191. See Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 6, at 1050-52.
192. See id.
193. See Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990) ("[W]e have consistently held
that state courts have inherent authority, and are thus presumptively competent, to
adjudicate claims arising under [federal law].").
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is reason for caution, however. Cooperative federalism is one
thing; many different eccentric or parochial interpretations of
federal law is quite another. Encouraging multiple interpreta-
tions of the same law may undercut the important policies that
uniformity supports. Like cases would not be treated alike, law
would be less predictable, planning more difficult, and surprise
more common.
The writers arguing for an independent state role refer to the
states as "laboratories."194 This suggests that they are arguing
by analogy to Justice Brandeis's famous observation in his dis-
sent in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann9 5 that "[ilt is one of the
happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous
State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try
novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of
the country."196 The analogy, though, is strained at best. 97 While
uniformity of state law between states is neither expected nor
even necessarily desirable, federal law should be uniform. Jus-
tice Brandeis likely would not have suggested that every county
in a state should adopt a different version of state law. Finally,
the argument that there is value in independent state court
determinations of federal law assumes that the Supreme Court
is available to resolve conflicts and correct mistakes. 9 8 This
assumption, however, is unrealistic because the Supreme Court
cannot review very many cases. 199 Consequently, instead of rich
discussions ending in timely, reasoned resolution, wholly inde-
pendent state court readings of federal law would result in
194. See Bator, supra note 190, at 608; Schwarzer et al., supra note 6, at 1746.
195. 285 U.S. 262 (1932).
196. Id. at 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see also Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288
U.S. 517, 577-80 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (noting, in action involving discrim-
inatory state licensing fees for corporate chain stores, the freedom of individual
states to enact regulation as "masters of their destiny").
197. As Professor Bator admits, the applicability of the "multiple laboratories of
social experimentation" argument to the question of "the proper role of state judges
in deciding issues of federal law . . . seems, at least at first glance, doubtful." Bator,
supra note 190, at 608.
198. See id. at 635 ("I intend to cast no doubt on the need for federal appellate
review of state court judgments on questions of federal law. Provision must be made
for uniform and authoritative pronouncements of federal law.").
199. See id. at 636 n.68.
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discord, forum shopping, and other practical problems in the
administration of justice.a °
C. Achieving the Goals of Correct and Uniform Interpretation of
Federal Law Through the Suggested Approach
Preliminarily, federal law would be more uniform if all state
courts followed the same clearly expressed standards for ascer-
taining it. At present, the state courts follow a wide range of
approaches and often fail to explain precisely what they are
doing. When a state court holds that it is not bound by lower
federal court decisions interpreting federal law, it merely tells us
what it is not doing. It seems logical that if all state courts
followed one set of expressed standards for ascertaining federal
law, they would be more likely to come to the same results.0 1
200. See Burt Neuborne, The Binding Quality of Supreme Court Precedent, 61
TUL. L. REV. 991, 1000 (1987) ("As we learned in Swift v. Tyson, the price of legal
cacophony is considerable, so considerable that I don't think a serious argument can
be made in its favor.").
201. The issue of what standards states should use to ascertain federal law is
probably itself a federal question. This supports adoption of one standard because
federal law should be uniform. See supra notes 184-87 and accompanying text. On
the other hand, one might argue that the standards are a matter of state procedure,
and therefore that individual state standards are appropriate. This argument, howev-
er, ignores the fact that the procedure is being used to determine the parameters of
federal law, thus giving the issue an undeniable federal element. Nonetheless, Con-
gress and the Supreme Court often allow the use of state law to "fill up" federal
law, rather than imposing a uniform federal standard. See BATOR ET AL. supra note
14, at 861-62 (explaining that state law often operates as the rule of decision be-
cause federal legislation or a federal court decision has determined that "state law
furnishes an appropriate and convenient measure of the content of... federal law").
There are, however, important implications in using state law this way. First, the
courts will not use state law if it undercuts important federal interests. See, e.g.,
United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 736 n.37 (1979) ("Adopting state
law as an appropriate federal rule does not preclude federal courts from excepting
local laws that prejudice federal interests."). Second, if the issue is fundamentally
federal, Congress or the Supreme Court can choose to impose a uniform federal
standard. See, e.g., Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 968 P.2d 924, 927-28 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998)
(noting intent of Congress to provide uniformity in the administration of benefit pro-
grams under ERISA); James W. Hambright & Robert J. Hambright, Labor and Em-
ployment Law, Fifth Circuit Survey, June 1986-May 1987, 19 TEL TECH L. REv. 731,
759 (1988) (noting congressional enactment of the Employment Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA) as a set of "uniform federal standards ... designed to displace
certain piecemeal federal and state laws").
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There are several reasons why the proposed approach would
best help achieve the correct and uniform interpretation of feder-
al law. We recognize today that law does not exist except in a
written text and in the opinions of the judges who construe that
text. 02 Ultimately, law means what the court that has the last
word on its meaning says it means. 2" That is the "correct"
meaning unless the legislature changes the law or the court
with the last word changes its interpretation. The Supreme
Court has the final word on the meaning of federal law-thus its
interpretation of a federal statutory or constitutional provision is
the "correct" construction until Congress changes the statute,
the people amend the Constitution, or the Supreme Court chang-
es its interpretation .2  A state court therefore has the best
chance of construing federal law correctly if it tries to make an
intelligent prediction of how the Supreme Court would construe
the law.
Interpretation of federal law would be more uniform if all
state courts attempted to imitate the same authoritative
source. 2 5 This is particularly true when there is little law on an
issue or when the lower federal courts are divided. When the
state courts must decide a novel federal question or choose
among conflicting decisions of the lower federal courts, consider-
ing how the Supreme Court would decide the issue should pro-
vide a unifying perspective. State courts are more likely to reach
202. As Burt Neuborne once put it, "[wie now understand that constitutional law
does not consist of an objective set of rules waiting to be discovered, but of the com-
plex institutional interplay between an ambiguous text and the institution vested
with responsibility to declare its meaning." Neuborne, supra note 200, at 999; see al-
so Walter V. Schaefer, Precedent and Policy, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 4 (1966) (stating
that lawyers "no longer consider that what the judge does is to make a selection
from an inexhaustible warehouse of pre-existing, ready-made legal principles").
203. See COFFIN, supra note 9, at 53 (arguing that "[h]igher courts are 'right' be-
cause they are 'superior,' not superior because they are right").
204. See, e.g., Tracey E. George, Developing a Positive Theory of Decisionmaking
on U.S. Courts of Appeals, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1635, 1636 (1998) (noting that the Su-
preme Court has the final word on federal law and cases); Paul Lund, The Decline
of Federal Common Law, 76 B.U. L. REV. 895, 909 n.49 (1996) (arguing that the Su-
preme Court has the final word on federal common law).
205. See Earl M. Malts, The Concept of the Doctrine of the Court in Constitutional
Law, 16 GA. L. REV. 357, 400 (1982).
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consistent results if they ask how the Supreme Court would
evaluate conflicting lower court decisions.
The categorical approaches are less likely to achieve a correct
result. State courts that consider themselves bound by lower
federal court decisions rely on second-hand authority. The lower
federal courts sometimes misinterpret federal law and are re-
versed by the Supreme Court. To rely entirely on secondary
sources seems less reliable than to predict what the Supreme
Court would do. Similarly, to ignore lower federal court opinions
also increases the chances of error. Lower federal courts have
expertise in interpreting federal law and make their decisions
with an eye to the Supreme Court. °6 Consequently, state courts
that follow one of the categorical approaches are less likely to
reach a correct result than if they attempt to predict what the
Supreme Court would hold, using lower federal court decisions
for guidance.
Categorical approaches also tend to impede uniformity. For
example, courts that consider themselves bound (or nearly so) by
decisions of their own circuit 20 7 may sometimes make national
uniformity more difficult to achieve. This is ironic because the
main reason the state courts follow their own circuits is to
achieve uniformity between the state and federal courts within
their states.08 In some cases, however, achieving intrastate uni-
formity may interfere with the goal of national uniformity. Con-
sider a situation in which the local circuit disagrees with eight
other circuits. For a state court to follow the local circuit and
ignore the other eight does not further the goal of national uni-
formity. This is not to say that intrastate uniformity is an unde-
sirable goal. In this context, however, when a court has to
choose between furthering intrastate uniformity and national
uniformity, it should choose national uniformity.0 9
206. The Supreme Court directs lower federal courts to follow its rules, though
the rules may be flexible. See Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding Constitutional Ques-
tions, 35 B.C. L. REV. 1003, 1026 n.118 (1994).
207. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
208. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
209. Courts that choose to follow their own circuit over other circuits to achieve
intrastate uniformity may do so by analogy to the policies underlying the Erie doc-
trine. A primary reason for requiring the federal courts to apply the law of the state
11851999]
1186 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:1143
State courts that go to the other extreme and virtually disre-
gard the decisions of the lower federal courts also may impede
the quest for uniformity. If the Supreme Court has not spoken,
but the lower federal courts speak with one voice, disregarding
that precedent destroys uniformity. When the lower federal
courts disagree, charting a wholly independent course may lead
to further splintering of federal law.
210
Finally, the proposed approach is directly analogous to the
approach that the federal courts follow for finding state law in
cases where state law governs. When state law is unclear, a fed-
eral court is to decide the state issue the way it believes the
state high court would.21' If the federal courts think this is the
best way to find state law, the proposed approach, by analogy, is
the best way for state courts to find federal law.
When a federal court decides that state law governs, it must
determine what state law is. Shortly after the Supreme Court
decided Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,212 it held that in the
in which they sit is to avoid forum shopping between federal and state courts within
a state. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74-77 (1938); see also Hanna v.
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 467-68 (1965) (noting the goal of discouraging forum shop-
ping). Thus, by analogy, state courts may apply federal law as interpreted by the
local federal courts to achieve the same end.
The analogy is inapposite, however, because the context is different. In the Erie
context, national uniformity is at best a secondary value. Indeed, Erie does nothing
at all to discourage interstate forum shopping: if state laws vary, litigants may
choose one state venue over another. When state courts apply federal law, however,
national uniformity is of primary importance, and intrastate uniformity becomes a
secondary goal. Thus, if the state courts that follow their own federal circuit to
achieve intrastate uniformity rely on Erie, that reliance is misplaced.
210. Some state court approaches do further the goal of uniformity when there is
a consistent body of federal authority upon which to rely. Thus, the states that con-
sider themselves bound by lower federal court decisions when the federal courts
agree, or those that generally follow those decisions when they are numerous and
consistent, help maintain uniform interpretation of federal law. See supra note 90
and accompanying text. In such circumstances, going along with the lower federal
courts may help achieve uniformity at least as well as trying to determine what the
Supreme Court would do. If the lower federal court decisions are numerous and con-
sistent, chances are quite good that the Supreme Court would rule the same way.
Moreover, the Supreme Court is less likely to grant review when the lower courts
agree than when they disagree, and therefore, the Supreme Court may never review
the issue.
211. See infra notes 216-17 and accompanying text.
212. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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absence of a state supreme court ruling, the federal courts were
bound to apply state law as declared by intermediate state ap-
pellate courts.213 In time, the Court modified its position. In King
v. Order of United Commercial Travelers of America,214 the Court
stated that decisions of lower state courts should be "attributed
some weight," but were "not controlling" when the highest state
court had not spoken. 2" Finally, in Commissioner v. Estate of
Bosch,216 the- Court directed federal judges to decide state law is-
sues the way they believe the state supreme court would:
This is but an application of the rule of Erie R. Co. v.
Tompkins... where state law as announced by the highest
court of the State is to be followed.... [Tihe State's highest
court is the best authority on its own law. If there be no deci-
sion by that court then federal authorities must apply what
they find to be the state law after giving "proper regard" to
relevant rulings of other courts of the State. In this respect,
it may be said to be, in effect, sitting as a state court.217
The Supreme Court did not explain why it chose this ap-
proach for ascertaining state law. The Court probably thought it
would best lead to a correct and uniform interpretation of state
law and would help federal courts give appropriate weight to
lower state court decisions. By analogy, the goals of correct and
uniform interpretation of federal law can best be furthered if
213. See Stoner v. New York Life Ins. Co., 311 U.S. 464, 468 (1940); West v.
American Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223, 236-37 (1940); Six Cos. v. Joint Highway
Dist. No. 13, 311 U.S. 180, 188 (1940). In one frequently criticized case, the Su-
preme Court held that the federal courts were bound by a decision of the New Jer-
sey Court of Chancery, a court of original jurisdiction, even though the Chancery
Court's ruling made little sense when applied to the merits. See Fidelity Union
Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U.S. 169, 178-79 (1940).
214. 333 U.S. 153 (1948).
215. Id. at 160-61.
216. 387 U.S. 456 (1967).
217. Id. at 465 (citation omitted). For lower federal court decisions following this
approach, see, e.g., Fields v. Farmers Ins. Co., 18 F.3d 831, 834 (10th Cir. 1994);
Travelers Ins. Co. v. 633 Third Assocs., 14 F.3d 114, 119 (2d Cir. 1994); Carvin v.
Arkansas Power & Light Co., 14 F.3d 399, 403-04 (8th Cir. 1993); L.S. Heath &
Son, Inc. v. AT & T Info. Sys., Inc., 9 F.3d 561, 574 (7th Cir. 1993); Nieves v. Uni-
versity of Puerto Rico, 7 F.3d 270, 274-75 (1st Cir. 1993); McKenna v. Ortho Pharm.
Corp., 622 F.2d 657, 661-62 (3d Cir. 1980).
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state courts decide federal questions the way they think the Su-
preme Court would decide them.
Ultimately, of course, there are limits in the quest for correct
and uniform interpretation of federal law. No approach will set
the state courts marching in harmonious lockstep. Honest differ-
ences of opinion will continue to exist, and some judges may
have such strong feelings on some issues that they will accept
only an explicit Supreme Court declaration. Nonetheless, for the
reasons outlined, if state judges try to decide federal questions
the way they believe the Supreme Court would, it will lead to a
more correct and uniform interpretation of federal law.
III. APPLYING THE PROPOSED STANDARD
Part II of the Article explained why state court judges should
decide federal questions the way they believe that the Supreme
Court would decide them. Part III discusses how judges might
put this approach into effect. How does the Supreme Court
decide cases? How should state judges go about predicting what
the Supreme Court would decide? On one level, it is relatively
easy to answer these questions: The Supreme Court decides
cases by applying the rules of stare decisis and statutory inter-
pretation. State judges should pretend they are sitting on the
Supreme Court and decide accordingly. On another level, howev-
er, it is virtually impossible to answer these questions. Parsing
precedents and statutes is an art, not a science.218 All the hard
issues demand not only keen analysis, but judgment, discretion,
and wisdom. How does one determine whether the Supreme
Court would interpret the holding of one of its prior cases nar-
rowly or broadly? Was the prior case meant to be the first step
in opening an expansive new thoroughfare or merely a one-time
detour into a cul-de-sac? 219 When a statutory provision is ambig-
218. See Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of
United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MAT-
TER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 8 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997)
(characterizing the technique of distinguishing cases as "an art or a game").
219. As Judge Frank Coffin points out, "Itihe disagreements arise when some
judges like a specific opinion and wish to expand its application and when others
dislike it and wish to confine it to its original bounds." COFFIN, supra note 8, at
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uous, how does a judge determine what the Supreme Court
would make of a series of oblique comments in House and
Senate Committee reports? As noted at the outset, many wise
people have written about the art of judging. "2 Part HI begins
by discussing the day-to-day processes that the Supreme Court
follows in deciding cases, and then offers some general sugges-
tions to assist state court judges in predicting how the Supreme
Court would decide a case. Finally, Part III discusses five situa-
tions that state judges routinely face in ascertaining federal law
and makes specific suggestions as to how they should proceed in
each situation.
A. How the Supreme Court Decides Cases
The Supreme Court has never written a comprehensive de-
scription of how it decides cases. No manual lays out the process
in hornbook fashion. It is possible, however, to discern parts of
the process from watching the Court in action. The Supreme
Court regularly decides novel issues of federal law; indeed, that
is its chief function. 2 ' In the course of their opinions, the Justic-
es sometimes remark on the decision-making process. The Court
often speaks about stare decisis; it has identified the policy rea-
sons underlying the doctrine and explained how it applies in
different contexts. The Court also speaks about the basic rules of
statutory construction. These discussions provide a helpful start-
ing point.
The Court views stare .decisis as indispensable2 2 2 because the
rule of law requires continuity over time.2 ' As the Court stated
260.
220. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
221. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
222. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, *854 (1992); see also
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989) ("[It is indisputable
that stare decisis is a basic self-governing principle within the Judicial Branch");
Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 494 (1987) ("[Tihe
doctrine of stare decisis is of fundamental importance to the rule of law.").
223. Several recent scholarly works challenge this assumption, at least in part.
See Paul L. Colby, Two Views on the Legitimacy of Nonacquiescence in Judicial
Opinions, 61 TUL. L. REV. 1041, 1058 (1987) (arguing that rules requiring lower
courts to follow higher courts are merely persuasive, not mandatory); David E.
Engdahl, What's in a Name? The Constitutionality of Multiple 'Supreme" Courts, 66
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in Payne v. Tennessee:2  "Stare decisis is the preferred course
because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent
development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial deci-
sions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of
the judicial process."225 In addition, stare decisis keeps law from
changing erratically based on "the proclivities of individuals."226
Although important, stare decisis is not a "universal inexora-
ble command."227 The Court gives the doctrine greater effect in
some contexts than in others. For example, the Court gives more
weight to prior decisions interpreting federal statutes than to
decisions interpreting the Constitution.228 Congress can amend a
statute if it dislikes the Supreme Court's interpretation, but only
IND. L.J. 457, 502 n.225 (1991) (questioning the role of stare decisis in constitutional
law); Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POLVY 23, 24 (1994) (arguing that the practice of following one's own prior precedent
"is affirmatively inconsistent with the federal Constitution"). There is no indication
that the courts have paid much attention to these arguments. See Caminker, supra
note 6, at 820 (noting that "[t]he reactions thus far to occasional . . . academic chal-
lenges to the doctrine of hierarchical precedent range from bemusement to brusque
dismissal").
224. 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
225. Id. at 827. Justice Harlan stressed similar values in an oft-cited passage
from Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970):
Very weighty considerations underlie the principle that courts should not
lightly overrule past decisions. Among these are the desirability that the
law furnish a clear guide for the conduct of individuals, to enable them
to plan their affairs with assurance against untoward surprise; the im-
portance of furthering fair and expeditious adjudication by eliminating
the need to relitigate every relevant proposition in every case; and the
necessity of maintaining public faith in the judiciary as a source of im-
personal and reasoned judgments.
Id. at 403; see also Caminker, supra note 6, at 839-56 (providing a detailed review
of the policies underlying stare decisis); Thomas S. Currier, Time and Change in
Judge-Made Law: Prospective Overruling, 51 VA. L. REV. 201, 235-37 (1965) (review-
ing the values served by stare decisis).
226. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 172.
227. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting); see also Casey, 505 U.S. at 854 (quoting Burnet); Payne, 501 U.S. at 828
(noting that stare decisis "'is a principal of policy and not a mechanical formula of
adherence to the latest decision" (quoting Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119
(1940))).
228. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 828 (pointing out that the Supreme Court overruled,
in whole or in part, 33 of its constitutional decisions over a 20 term period).
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the Court (or the People, through the amendment process) can
change a constitutional ruling. Thus, the Court believes it
should be more willing to reconsider its constitutional deci-
sions.229 The Court also purports to give more weight to prece-
dents that are politically controversial 230 or that involve property
or contract rights where parties have relied on prior decisions.23'
By contrast, the Court gives less weight to precedent in cases in-
volving procedural or evidentiary rules.3 2
The Supreme Court also uses the same techniques that all
courts use to weigh and evaluate precedent. As Judge Ruggero
J. Aldisert notes, "[there are precedents, and there are prece-
dents.... All... do not have the same bite."233 The Supreme
Court gives prior cases greater weight if the issue involved was
clearly presented, fully considered, and explicitly decided.2s The
229. See id.; Casey, 505 U.S. at 954-55 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("Erroneous decisions in . . . constitutional
cases are uniquely durable, because correction through legislative action, save for
constitutional amendment, is impossible"); Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff
Bureau, Inc., 476 U.S. 409, 424 (1986) (noting a "strong presumption of continued
validity that adheres in the judicial interpretation of a statute); Arizona v. Rumsey,
467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984) ("[Aldherence to precedent is not rigidly required in consti-
tutional cases.").
230. See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 985 (1996) (advocating "adhere[nee] to
stare decisis, especially in . . . sensitive political contexts"); Casey, 505 U.S. at 867-
69 (reaffirming Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
231. See, e.g., Payne, 501 U.S. at 828 ("Considerations in favor of stare decisis are
at their acme in cases involving property and contract rights, where reliance inter-
ests are involved."); United States v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 265 U.S. 472, 486-87
(1924) (reaffirming a decision that affected many tracts of land in California). But
see BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 122 (1924) ("The picture of the
bewildered litigant lured into a course of action by the false light of a decision, only
to meet ruin when the light is extinguished and the decision overruled, is for the
most part a figment of excited brains.").
232. See United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 521 (1995) (finding the effect of
stare decisis "somewhat reduced" in cases involving procedural rules); Payne, 501
U.S. at 828 (finding stare decisis to be of the lowest value in procedural cases).
233. Ruggero J. Aldisert, Precedent: What It Is and What It Isn't: When Do We
Kiss It and When Do We Kill It?, 17 PEPP. L. REv. 605, 630-31 (1990); see also
Schaefer, supra note 202, at 7 ("iWihen the judicial process is viewed from the in-
side, nothing is clearer than that all decisions are not of equivalent value to the
court which renders them.").
234. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198 (1976) (considering and rejecting
"administrative ease and convenience as sufficiently important objectives to justify
gender-based classifications"); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339
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Court also gives prior precedent less weight when the issue was
not clearly presented or substantively treated2 5 or was decided
sub silentio.2 6 Similarly, the Court generally gives great weight
to a principle that is consistently applied over time in many cas-
es,2"7 but it may give considerably less weight to a principle ap-
pearing in only one opinion. 23 8 Naturally, the Court gives hold-
U.S. 306 (1950) (addressing and specifically deciding the type of notice required by
the Due Process Clause).
235. See, e.g., Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 118-19
(1984) (declining to follow earlier cases that granted relief against state officials on
the basis of state law claims pendent to federal constitutional claims because the
Court did not directly confront or explicitly mention the Eleventh Amendment ques-
tion); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 669-70 (1974) (disregarding several
affirmances of lower court judgments ordering state officials to make retroactive pay-
ments of wrongly withheld public benefits because the Court did not refer to or sub-
stantively treat the Eleventh Amendment objection raised by state officials).
236. See, e.g., Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 535 n.5 (1974) ("[Wihen questions
of jurisdiction have been passed on in prior decisions sub silentio, this Court has
never considered itself bound when a subsequent case finally brings the jurisdictional
issue before us.").
237. See Schaefer, supra note 202, at 11 (noting that "[a] settled course of deci-
sion is more compelling than an isolated precedent"). The notice principle set forth
in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 389 U.S. 306 (1950), provides a
good example. In Mullane, the Court stated: "An elementary and fundamental re-
quirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice
reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of
the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objec-
tions." Id. at 314. The Court has consistently applied this principle to preclude no-
tice by publication and/or posting when the name of the interested party is readily
ascertainable and notice by mail is possible. See, e.g., Tulsa Profl Collection Servs.,
Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 484, 490-91 (1988); Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams,
462 U.S. 791, 795-800 (1983); Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 449-56 (1982);
Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208, 211-14 (1962); Walker v. City of
Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112, 115-16 (1956). After all of these decisions, the Mullane
principle clearly has great authority: Notice solely by publication and/or posting sim-
ply will not suffice when the name and address of an interested party are readily
ascertainable.
The well-pleaded complaint rule, which is applied to determine whether a feder-
al court has federal question jurisdiction, provides another good example. By the
time it decided Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908), the
Court was able to cite 18 cases that had applied the rule. See id. at 154. Although
frequently criticized, the rule is now cast in stone. See generally Donald L.
Doernberg, There's No Reason For It; It's Just Our Policy: Why the Well-Pleaded
Complaint Rule Sabotages the Purposes of Federal Question Jurisdiction, 38
HASTINGS L.J. 597 (1987) (analyzing the historical development of the "well-pleaded
complaint" rule).
238. Consider, for example, the Court's recognition in Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S.
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ings more weight than dicta.2" 9 As Justice Scalia has observed,
however, "what constitutes the 'holding' of an earlier case is not
well defined and can be adjusted to suit the occasion.
" 24
The Supreme Court also weighs different sources of authority
differently; some are given great weight, some a little less, some
less still, and so on. To identify this hierarchy of authorities, it
is helpful to review lower federal court decisions that discuss the
methods used to ascertain state law. As noted above, the lower
federal courts must decide issues of state law the way they think
the highest court of the state would decide them.241 To imple-
527 (1981), that negligent loss of property by a state official may constitute a depri-
vation within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
if a proper redress under state tort law is unavailable. See id. at 531-35, 544. Five
years later, in Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986), the Court reversed ground
on this point, stating- "No decision of this Court before Parratt supported the view
that negligent conduct by a state official, even though causing injury, constitutes a
deprivation under the Due Process Clause." Id. at 330-31. Similarly, in Seminole
Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), the Court reversed the rule announced in Penn-
sylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989), that the Commerce Clause granted
Congress the power to abrogate state sovereign immunity. See Seminole Tribe, 517
U.S. at 47, 64. The Court was highly critical of the Union Gas rule, saying that it
was reached without an expressed rationale agreed upon by a majority of the Court,
that it had created confusion among the lower courts, and that it "deviated sharply
from our established federalism jurisprudence and essentially eviscerated our decision
in Hans [v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890)]." Id. at 64.
239. The classic statement of this principle is in Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6
Wheat.) 264 (1821):
It is a maxim not to be disregarded, that general expressions, in every
opinion, are to be taken in connection with the case in which those ex-
pressions are used. If they go beyond the case, they may be respected,
but ought not to control the judgment in a subsequent suit when the
very point is presented for decision. The reason of this maxim is obvious.
The question actually before the court is investigated with care and con-
sidered in its full extent. Other principles which may serve to illustrate
it, are considered in their relation to the case decided, but their possible
bearing on all other cases is seldom completely investigated.
Id. at 399-400.
240. Scalia, supra note 218, at 8. Justice Scalia continued:
At its broadest, the holding of a case can be said to be the analytical
principle that produced the judgment .... In the narrowest sense, how-
ever, (and courts will squint narrowly when they wish to avoid an earlier
decision), the holding of a case cannot go beyond the facts that were be-
fore the court.
Id.
241. See supra notes 212-17 and accompanying text.
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ment this mandate, federal courts have identified the hierarchy
of authority that state high courts follow. Judge Adams's
thoughtful opinion in McKenna v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.2
suggests that a state supreme court looks first to its own prior
decisions." If there are none directly on point, the court will
turn to its decisions in analogous cases and may also consider
its own prior dicta.24 Next, a state high court looks to decisions
of lower state and federal courts, giving them "proper regard,"
but not conclusive effect. 245 Finally, the court may consider
scholarly treatises, Restatements of the law, and germane law
review articles. 4
The Supreme Court follows a very similar process in deciding
cases. In any volume of the U.S. Reports, the Supreme Court is
the court most often cited. Unless it has a good excuse, 4 the
Court follows its own precedent when it is directly on point or
closely analogous to the case it is deciding. 48 Next, the Court
242. 622 F.2d 657 (3d Cir. 1980).
243. See id. at 662.
244. See id. at 662-63.
245. See id.
246. See id. Other cases suggest a similar hierarchy of authority. See, e.g., Trav-
elers Ins. Co. v. 633 Third Assocs., 14 F.3d 114, 119 (2d Cir. 1994) (looking to "state
decisional law, federal cases which construe the state statute, scholarly works and
any other reliable data tending to indicate how the New York Court of Appeals
would resolve the [issue]"); Ryan v. Royal Ins. Co. of America, 916 F.2d 731, 734-35
(1st Cir. 1990) (considering "such sources as analogous state court decisions, adjudi-
cations in cases elsewhere, and public policy imperatives"); Bailey v. V & 0 Press
Co., 770 F.2d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 1985) (looking to "the decisional law of the Ohio
Supreme Court in analogous cases and relevant dicta in related cases," lower Ohio
state court decisions, Restatements of the law, law reviews, and decisions from other
jurisdictions). For the results of an interesting empirical study suggesting that feder-
al courts often do not faithfully attempt to apply state law in diversity cases, see
David A. Thomas, The Erosion of Erie in the Federal Courts: Is State Law Losing
Ground? 1977 BYU L. REV. 1; see also Geri J. Yonover, Ascertaining State Law: The
Continuing Erie Dilemma, 38 DEPAUL L. REV. 1 (1989) (discussing the erosion of the
Erie doctrine in federal courts).
247. See supra notes 227-32 and accompanying text.
248. See, e.g., Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 564-
65 (1987) (noting that on numerous occasions the Court has allowed individual em-
ployees to sue under federal statutes despite the availability of arbitration under the
theory that suits should be allowed when the federal statute is designed to provide
minimum substantive guarantees to individual workers); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411
U.S. 677, 682 (1973) (noting that "classifications based upon sex, like classifications
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looks to decisions of the lower federal courts 49 or the state
courts on the issue."' Opinions by highly respected jurists seem
based on race, alienage, and national origin are inherently suspect"); Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 402-04 (1971)
(Harlan, J., concurring) (noting that the Court has often implied private rights of ac-
tion under federal statutes and that it would "at least be anomalous to conclude"
that the Court could not do the same under the Constitution).
249. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Asphalt Prods. Co., 482 U.S. 117, 119-21 (1987)
(specifically following Second Circuit decisions and quoting them with approval);
Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 111-12 (1987) (plurality
opinion) (citing several lower federal court decisions for the proposition that the Due
Process Clause requires a nonresident manufacturer to take some affirmative steps
to direct its product to the forum state in order to be subject to jurisdiction). The
Court's reliance on lower federal court opinions is particularly apparent when it
grants review to resolve a split in the circuits. Generally, the Court adopts one of
the positions espoused in the circuit courts. See, e.g., Old Chief v. United States, 519
U.S. 172, 177-78 (1997) (following the rule of several circuits that when a prior con-
viction is an element of a present charge, a prosecutor may not introduce the name
and nature of the offense underlying the conviction when the defendant agrees to
stipulate that the conviction occurred); Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681,
685 (1988) (adopting the position of several circuits that the party introducing evi-
dence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) must
give sufficient evidence to support a jury finding that the other conduct occurred);
Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 52-54 (1979) (agreeing with the view of a
majority of the circuits that state law, rather than federal common law, governs the
steps a mortgagee must take to acquire a security interest in the rents from mort-
gaged property following a bankruptcy adjudication).
250. See, e.g., Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 394-95 (1994) (suggesting that the
Eighth Circuit should have looked to state court decisions on whether the Double
Jeopardy Clause applies to noncapital sentencing hearings, and stating that
"[c]onstitutional law is not the exclusive province of the federal courts, and in the
Teague [v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989)] analysis the reasonable views of state courts
are entitled to consideration along with those of federal courts"); Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190, 208 (1976) ("[Bloth federal and state courts uniformly have declared the
unconstitutionality of gender lines that restrain the activities of customers at state-
regulated liquor establishments irrespective of the operation of the Twenty-first
Amendment." (citations omitted)). When the Supreme Court reviews a federal issue
raised in a state court case, it sometimes accepts the state supreme court's inter-
pretation of federal law over the interpretation given by the lower federal courts.
See Wimberly v. Labor & Indus. Relations Comm'n, 479 U.S. 511, 514 (1987) (ac-
cepting the view of the Missouri Supreme Court, rather than that of the Fourth Cir-
cuit, that denial of unemployment compensation benefits was proper under applicable
federal statute), affg 688 S.W.2d 344 (Mo. 1985); Brown v. Palmer Clay Prods. Co.,
297 U.S. 227 (1936) (accepting the view of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu-
setts and two federal circuits, instead of the view of another federal circuit, on the
construction of a federal bankruptcy statute), affg 195 N.E. 122 (Mass. 1935).
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to be given particular weight.251 Finally, the Court often relies
on legal periodicals 25 2 and other secondary sources.
21
The Supreme Court also regularly discusses the basic rules of
statutory interpretation, purporting to follow many of the tradi-
tional maxims of statutory construction. 2' For example, the
Court tries to construe statutes to avoid constitutional ques-
251. See, e.g., Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 454-
55 (1989) (quoting opinion by Judge Learned Hand discussing statutory interpreta-
tion); Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 820 (1986) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (referring to Judge Henry J. Friendly's "authoritative opinion" in T.B.
Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1964)); Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v.
University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971) (citing and accepting Justice Roger
Traynor's opinion for a unanimous court in Bernhard v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust &
Say. Ass'n, 122 P.2d 892 (Cal. 1942), rejecting the doctrine of mutuality of estoppel);
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (citing Judge
Learned Hand for the proposition that the terms "present" or "presence" are used
merely to symbolize those activities of corporate agents within a state that courts
will deem sufficient to satisfy the demands of due process).
252. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 110-11, n.8 (1996) (Souter,
J., dissenting) (citing the "great weight of scholarly commentary" for the proposition
that the history and structure of the Eleventh Amendment show that it reaches only
to suits brought under the diversity jurisdiction); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms.,
Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993) (citing several legal authorities that suggested factors
for courts to consider in deciding whether scientific evidence is reliable); Parklane
Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 329 n.11 (1979) (noting that various commen-
tators have expressed reservations about the use of offensive collateral estoppel);
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 72 (1938) (relying in part on an article by
Charles Warren for the conclusion that the construction given the Rules of Decision
Act by Swift v. Tyson was incorrect).
253. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 & n.11 (1954) (citing
sociological and psychological literature in support of the proposition that racial
segregation adversely affects black school children).
254. One problem with maxims, however, as Karl Llewellyn pointed out many
years ago, is that "there are two opposing canons on almost every point." Karl N.
Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons
About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401 (1950). Justice
Scalia criticizes Llewellyn, suggesting that many of his contradictory pairs of canons
are simply a rule and an exception. See Scalia, supra note 218, at. 27. Justice Scalia,
however, does not favor the use of maxims:
To the honest textualist, all of these preferential rules and presumptions
are a lot of trouble. It is hard enough to provide a uniform, objective
answer to the question whether a statute, on balance, more reasonably
means one thing or another. But it is virtually impossible to expect uni-
formity and objectivity when there is added, on one or the other side of
the balance, a thumb of indeterminate weight.
Id. at 28.
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tions.2 55 Remedial statutes are construed broadly;256 penal stat-
utes narrowly.257 The Court does not construe statutory phrases
in isolation, but rather in the context of the whole statute.258
The justices seem to agree on several fundamental principles
of statutory interpretation. As Justice Rehnquist stated in Grif-
fin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc. :259 "Our task is to give effect to
the will of Congress ....2  The justices start with the words of
a statute when searching for its meaning.26 1 When the language
is clear and unambiguous, the Court follows the plain mean-
ing62 in the absence of "a clearly expressed legislative intent to
255. See Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 466 ("It has long been an axiom of statutory
interpretation that 'where an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would
raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid
such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Con-
gress.'" (quoting Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr.
Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988))).
256. See Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 543 (1994) ("We have
liberally construed FELA to further Congress' remedial goal."); Monell v. Department
of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 684 (1978) ("This act is remedial, and in aid of pres-
ervation of human liberty and human rights. All .. .such statutes are liberally and
beneficently construed." (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. app. 68 (1871)
(statement of Rep. Shellabarger) (describing how the courts should interpret § 1 of
the Civil Rights Act of 1871))).
257. See Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 463 (1991); Moskal v. United
States, 498 U.S. 103, 113 (1990).
258. See, e.g., United States v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822, 828 (1984) ("We do not,
however, construe statutory phrases in isolation; we read statutes as a whole.");
Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 713 (1975) ('In expounding a statute, we must
not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provi-
sions of the whole law, and to its object and policy.' (quoting United States v. Heirs
of Boisdore, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 113, 122 (1850))).
259. 458 U.S. 564 (1982).
260. Id. at 570; see also United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S.
534, 542 (1940) ("[The function of the courts is ... to construe the language so as
to give effect to the intent of Congress.").
261. See, e.g., West Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 98 (1991)
("The best evidence of that purpose is the statutory text adopted by both Houses of
Congress' and submitted to the President."); Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v.
Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 835 (1990) ("The starting point for interpretation of a stat-
ute is the language of the statute itself."); American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. at
543 ("There is, of course, no more persuasive evidence of the purpose of a statute
than the words by which the legislature undertook to give expression to its wish-
es.").
262. See West Virginia Univ. Hosps., 499 U.S. at 101 ("[The statute's] language is
plain and unambiguous. What the government asks is not a construction of a stat-
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the contrary."2 3 The Court does not apply the plain meaning
rule "in rare cases [when] the literal application of a statute will
produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its
drafters."2'4 In such cases, the legislator's intentions control.
2 6 5
Similarly, the Court does not read a statute literally if the result
would be absurd and some other interpretation is available that
is consistent with legislative intent.266
The problem, of course, is that the justices disagree about how
these principles apply in individual cases. There is "no errorless
test for identifying or recognizing 'plain' or 'unambiguous' lan-
guage."267 Nor is there any clear test for deciding when a literal
reading is sufficiently absurd to justify evading it. 268 Further-
ute, but, in effect, an enlargement of it by the court. ... To supply omissions tran-
scends the judicial function." (quoting Iselin v. United States, 270 U.S. 245, 250-51
(1926))); United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989) (stating that
where "the statutes language is plain, 'the sole function of the courts is to enforce it
according to its terms.'" (quoting Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485
(1917))); Commissioner v. Asphalt Prods. Co., 482 U.S. 117, 121 (1987) ("Judicial per-
ception that a particular result would be unreasonable . . .cannot justify disregard
of what Congress has plainly and intentionally provided."); American Trucking
Ass'ns, 310 U.S. at 543 ("Often [the] words are sufficient in and of themselves to de-
termine the purpose of the legislation. In such cases we have followed their plain
meaning.").
263. Kaiser Aluminum, 494 U.S. at 835 ("'Absent a clearly expressed legislative
intention to the contrary, [the] language [of the statute] must ordinarily be regarded
as conclusive.'" (quoting Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447
U.S. 102, 108 (1980)).
264. Griffin, 458 U.S. at 571; see also Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of
Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 454 (1989) ("Where the literal reading of a statutory term
would 'compel an odd result,' . . . we must search for other evidence of congressional
intent to lend the term its proper scope." (quoting Green v. Bock Laundry Machine
Co., 490 U.S. 504, 509 (1989)); American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 71
(1982) ("Statutes should be interpreted to avoid untenable distinctions and unreason-
able results whenever possible.").
265. See Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. at 242; Griffin, 458 U.S. at 571.
266. See, e.g., Griffin, 458 U.S. at 575; American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. at 543
("When [plain] meaning has led to absurd or futile results, however, this Court has
looked beyond the words to the purpose of the act.").
267. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981).
268. Consider, for example, Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., which concerned a
statute that required the employer of a seaman to pay double wages for each day
the seaman's pay was withheld without sufficient cause. The employer in Griffin im-
properly withheld $412.50 in wages, but by the time the matter was litigated and
judgment entered, the penalty had grown to over $300,000. See Griffin, 458 U.S.
at 574-75. The majority held that the plain meaning of the statute required the
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more, there simply is "no invariable rule for the discovery of...
the intent of Congress."2" The current justices disagree about
what sources they may properly consult to determine that
intent.270 As Justice Stevens noted: "In recent years the Court
has vacillated between a purely literal approach to the task of
statutory interpretation and an approach that seeks guidance
from historical context, legislative history, and prior cases iden-
tifying the purpose that motivated the legislation."2"'
This fundamental disagreement surfaces in many cases. For
example, in Chapman v. United States,272 the majority applied
the literal language of a statute that set minimum mandatory
sentences based on the weight of a "mixture or substance con-
taining a detectable amount" of LSD, even though different of-
fenders received very different sentences depending on whether
the same amount of LSD was contained on a blotter, in a gel, or
in a sugar cube.27 The dissent examined House and Senate
Committee reports that showed Congress wanted to rationalize
sentencing practices and impose equal penalties for the same
wrongdoing274 and concluded that "[t]he Court today shows little
respect for Congress's handiwork when it construes a statute to
undermine the very goals that Congress sought to achieve." 75 By
contrast, in Public Citizen v. United States Department of Jus-
tice,276 the majority engaged in a full-blown review of the legisla-
tive history to determine whether the Federal Advisory Commit-
tee Act (FACA) should apply to an American Bar Association
Committee that advised the Justice Department on potential
employer to pay the full amount. See id. at 577. Justice Stivens, joined by Justice
Blackmun, dissented, arguing that the result of a literal reading was absurd, and
that qualifying language in the statute allowed a much narrower construction. See
id. at 577-78 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
269. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. at 542.
270. See West Virginia Hasp., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 112-15 (1991) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (discussing examples of different approaches).
271. Id. at 112 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
272. 500 U.S. 453 (1991).
273. Id. at 461-62.
274. See id. at 477 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
275. Id.
276. 491 U.S. 440 (1989).
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nominees for the federal judiciary.27 Justice Kennedy, joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor, strongly criti-
cized this approach:
I cannot accept the method by which the Court arrives at its
interpretation of FACA, which does not accord proper respect
to the finality and binding effect of legislative enactments.
... Where it is clear that the unambiguous language of a
statute embraces certain conduct, and it would not be patent-
ly absurd to apply the statute to such conduct, it does not
foster a democratic exegesis for this Court to rummage
through unauthoritative materials to consult the spirit of the
legislation in order to discover an alternative interpretation
of the statute with which the Court is more comfortable.27 8
Justice Scalia's use of yet another approach to statutory con-
struction confuses the matter even more. He calls his approach
"textualism,"279 which he assures us is neither "strict construc-
tionism" nor literalism."' A textualist is leery of appeals to leg-
islative intent. 8' Justice Scalia agrees with Justice Holmes's
remark that "'[we do not inquire what the legislature meant;
277. See id. at 453-67.
278. Id. at 468-69, 473 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). Disagreement
among the justices is intense, as is evident from contrasting Justice Kennedy's state-
ment with Justice Stevens's statement in West Virginia University Hospital, Inc. v.
Casey, 499 U.S. 83 (1991):
In the domain of statutory interpretation, Congress is the master. It ob-
viously has the power to correct our mistakes, but we do the country a
disservice when we needlessly ignore persuasive evidence of Congress'
actual purpose and require it "to take the time to revisit the matter" and
to restate its purpose in more precise English whenever its work product
suffers from an omission or inadvertent error.
Id. at 115 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
279. Scalia, supra note 218, at 23.
280. See id. at 23-24. Scalia asserts that textualism
should not be confused with so-called strict constructionism .... A text
should not be construed strictly, and it should not be construed leniently;
it should be construed reasonably, to contain all that it fairly means.
Words do have a limited range of meaning, and no interpretation that
goes beyond that range is permissible.
Id.
281. See id. at 29-37 (rejecting "intent of the legislature as the proper criticism of
the law").
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we ask only what the statute means.' 28 2 When a statute is am-
biguous, Justice Scalia is willing to look beyond its four corners
to determine its meaning: "Where a statutory term... is am-
biguous, we construe it to contain that permissible meaning
which fits most logically and comfortably into the body of both
previously and subsequently enacted law."28 For the textualist,
he says, "context is everything."2 ' He does not believe, however,
that legislative history is an authoritative source of a statute's
meaning: "It is [not] our task.., to enter the minds of the Mem-
bers of Congress-who need have nothing in mind in order for
their votes to be both lawful and effective-but rather to give
fair and reasonable meaning to the text of the United States
Code. 285
The justices follow several different approaches to discern leg-
islative intent. Moreover, no approach commands a majority in
all cases. Lower federal courts and state courts must muddle
through without clear guidance. Unfortunately, a comment by
Henry Hart and Albert Sacks still seems true today:
Do not expect anybody's theory of statutory interpretation,
whether it is your own or somebody else's, to be an accurate
statement of what courts actually do with statutes. The hard
truth of the matter is that American courts have no intelligi-
ble, generally accepted, and consistently applied theory of
statutory interpretation. 6
Plainly, this is a difficult time to follow the "Court's" approach to
statutory interpretation.
B. Predicting How the Supreme Court Would Decide
It is relatively easy to state general rules about how the Su-
preme Court-or individual justices-decide cases. It is another
282. Id. at 23 (quoting OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERs 207
(1920)).
283. West Virginia Univ. Hosps., 499 U.S. at 100.
284. Scalia, supra note 218, at 37.
285. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 30 (Scalia, J., concurring and
dissenting).
286. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKs, THE LEGAL PROCESS 1169 (Wil-
liam N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994).
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matter to apply those rules. It is yet another matter to predict
how someone else would apply them, and it is even harder to
predict how a group of nine other people would apply them. It is
thus no wonder that some state courts prefer to consider them-
selves bound by lower federal court decisions when there are no
Supreme Court opinions on point.287
The complexity of the task facing state courts should not be
overstated, however. State judges are familiar with federal law
because they must apply it frequently. They know who sits on
the Supreme Court and routinely read Supreme Court opin-
ions. 288 Thus, a state court trying to predict a Supreme Court
outcome approaches the task with a large body of information.
Predicting what the Supreme Court would do is certainly no
harder than some other predictions state courts must make. For
example, horizontal choice of law rules often require state judges
to apply the law of a sister state or a foreign country.28 9 When
the high court of the other jurisdiction has not spoken on the
issue, predicting what it would say can be extremely difficult.
290
A state court judge may have to do considerable research to
acquaint herself with the law of another state or a foreign
country.29'
In deciding federal issues, state courts should begin by using
the same legal sources that the Supreme Court uses-statutes
and legislative materials, prior Supreme Court decisions, lower
federal and state court cases, Restatements, treatises, and other
scholarly works.292 State courts should also apply the same hier-
archy of authorities and interpretive methods that the Supreme
Court follows. 29 They should use the same basic techniques the
287. See supra notes 37, 42, 46, and accompanying text.
288. See infra notes 310-16 and accompanying text.
289. See Nolan v. Transocean Air Lines, 276 F.2d 280, 281 (2d Cir. 1960).
290. One is reminded of Judge Friendly's observation in Nolan: "Our principal
task, in this diversity of citizenship case, is to determine what the New York courts
would think the California courts would think on an issue about which neither has
thought." Id.
291. See, e.g., id. at 281, 283.
292. See Michael C. Dorf, Prediction and the Rule of Law, 42 UCLA L. REV. 651,
654 (1995) (noting that it is the convention for lower court judges to decide cases
"by consulting the same impersonal sources of law as high court judges consult").
293. See Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking As-
pects of Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX L. REV. 1, 9 (1994) (asserting that,
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Supreme Court uses in weighing and evaluating precedent and
construing statutes.294
It is difficult to decide whether state courts should go further
and consider additional information about individual justices to
try to predict their votes. Courts and commentators disagree
about what one court may appropriately consider in predicting
the decision of another court. Some think it is inappropriate to
consider an individual Justice's public statements or scholarly
articles, or her background or general political and social
views.295 Others think it is perfectly legitimate to consider such
matters.
296
after identifying relevant legal sources, judges "must apply some combination of vari-
ous methods of interpretation in order to discern the meaning of those sources").
Justice Scalia conveyed a similar idea:
[W]hen the Supreme Court of the federal system, or of one of the state
systems, decides a case, not merely the outcome of that decision, but the
mode of analysis that it applies will thereafter be followed by the lower
courts within that system, and even by that supreme court itself.
Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CmH. L. REV. 1175, 1177
(1989).
294. This suggestion is difficult to follow because of the lack of consensus on a
theory of statutory interpretation. The justices occasionally agree on a rule of statu-
tory construction in a specific context; when they do, state courts should follow the
new rule of interpretation. For example, in 1979, the Court made a sharp break
with tradition and adopted a new test for deciding whether to imply a private right
of action from a federal statute. In Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560
(1979), and Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979), the
Court abandoned the traditional multi-factor standard set forth in Cort v. Ash, 422
U.S. 66 (1975), and adopted a single factor test. See Touche Ross & Co., 442 U.S. at
568 ("[O]ur task is limited solely to determining whether Congress intended to create
the private right of action asserted.") (emphasis added); Transamerica, 444 U.S. at
15-16 (citing Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 568). See generally Donald H. Zeigler, Rights
Require Remedies: A New Approach to the Enforcement of Rights in the Federal
Courts, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 665, 708-26 (1987) (discussing the potential impact of Tou-
che Ross and Transamerica on state courts deciding issues of federal rights). Given
the Court's clear language, state judges should follow the new standard when they
are asked to imply a private right of action under a federal statute.
295. See NAACP v. Medical Ctr., Inc., 657 F.2d 1322, 1330 (3d Cir. 1981); Ferina
v. United States, 340 F.2d 837, 839 (8th Cir. 1965); United States v. Swift & Co.,
189 F. Supp. 885, 901 (N.D. Ill. 1960), affd, 367 U.S. 909 (1961); United States v.
Silverman, 166 F. Supp. 838, 840 (D.D.C. 1958). See generally Dorf, supra note 292
(examining arguments for and against judges using a "prediction approach" in cases
involving the resolution of an issue for which the court lacks final authority); id. at
686-89 (criticizing the use of prediction models "as a general approach to lower court
adjudication").
296. See United States v. White, 405 F.2d 838, 847-48 (7th Cir. 1969), rev'd, 401
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Lower federal courts profess reluctance to predict Supreme
Court outcomes based on assessments of individual justices, but
on occasion they do so. In United States v. Silverman,297 the
court said it was inappropriate "to speculate on what at some
future time the Supreme Court might decide in the light of
changes of personnel, and in light of the various remarks of indi-
vidual members of the Court."29 In United States v. White,
299
however, the circuit court declined to follow a Supreme Court
precedent because it was a five to four decision, its authority
had been eroded by recent cases, and many of the current jus-
tices had explicitly criticized it. 3"
Some federal judges are quite free-wheeling in predicting
what state high courts would decide, while others are more
circumspect. Chief Justice Rehnquist once observed that in mak-
ing this prediction, a federal judge "must use not only his legal
reasoning skills, but also his experiences and perceptions of judi-
cial behavior in that State." °1 Similarly, the Third Circuit said
that in predicting Pennsylvania Supreme Court behavior it must
"consider relevant state precedents, analogous decisions, consid-
ered dicta, scholarly works, and any other reliable data tending
convincingly to show how the... court... would decide the is-
sue." °2 By contrast, in City of Philadelphia v. Lead Industries
U.S. 745 (1971); see also Doff, supra note 292, at 656-57, 671-78 (examining argu-
ments supporting use of the predictive model).
297. 166 F. Supp. 838 (D.D.C. 1958), affd, 275 F.2d 173 (D.C. Cir. 1960), rev'd,
365 U.S. 505 (1961).
298. Id. at 840; see also NAACP, 657 F.2d at 1330 (following Supreme Court pre-
cedent even though "there is ample ground for argument that the Supreme Court
has doubts about [a decision's] continued viability"); Ferina, 340 F.2d at 839 (declin-
ing to consider changes in Supreme Court personnel to "forecast the law of the Su-
preme Court"); Swift, 189 F. Supp. at 901 ("We are not free . . . to speculate upon
probabilities or personalities.").
299. 405 F.2d 838 (7th Cir. 1969), rev'd, 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
300. See id. at 847; see also Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. Walsh, 139 F.2d 809,
815 (2d Cir. 1943) (declining to follow Supreme Court precedent in part because of
personnel change), vacated sub nom., Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323
U.S. 101 (1944).
301. Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 241 (1991) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting).
302. Packard v. Provident Natal Bank, 994 F.2d 1039, 1046 (3d Cir. 1993) (empha-
sis added). In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Armstrong, 949 F.2d
99 (3d Cir. 1991), the Third Circuit engaged in explicit head-counting by assembling
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Ass'n,' °S the same court said that "federal courts may not engage
in judicial activism" in diversity cases."' Instead, "[flederalism
concerns require that we permit state courts to decide whether
and to what extent they will expand state common law."
3 15
Commentators also disagree as to what information lower
courts may properly consider in predicting what a higher court
would decide. Some argue that it is improper to consider infor-
mation about the personal views of individual justices. For ex-
ample, Michael Dorf states:
The prediction model requires lower court judges, as well as
the lawyers and clients who appear before them, to conceive
of law as a prediction of how the particular individuals sit-
ting on the high court would resolve the issue presented. This
conception is inconsistent with central specific practices of
American law-including the norm of the impartial adjudica-
tor, the doctrine of stare decisis, and the institutional integri-
ty of courts. More broadly, the prediction model is inconsis-
tent with the overarching theme of the rule of law, of which
these specific practices are manifestations.0 6
Others disagree, and contend that it is appropriate to consider
the views of individual justices in some circumstances. For
the views of Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justices from a variety of written sources.
See id. at 103-04; see also Pomerantz v. Clark, 101 F. Supp. 341, 345-46 (D. Mass.
1951) (characterizing the task of divining the view of the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court as "less philosophical and more psychological" and reviewing the gen-
eral decisionmaking approach of that court).
303. 994 F.2d 112 (3d Cir. 1993).
304. Id. at 123.
305. Id.; see also Taylor v. Phelan, 9 F.3d 882, 887 (10th Cir. 1993) (noting that
"we are generally reticent to expand state law without clear guidance from'its high-
est court"); Polk County v. Lincoln Natl Life Ins. Co., 262 F.2d 486, 489 (5th Cir.
1959) (criticizing a process that "attempt[ed] to psychoanalyze state court judges
rather than to rationalize state court decisions").
306. Dorf, supra note 292, at 685; see also Charles Fried, Impudence, 1992 Sup.
CT. REV. 155, 187 (stating that a judge's task "is to interpret the superior courts'
opinions, and that means taking their text-not the subjective intentions of their
authors-and fitting it into the whole body of controlling legal materials"); David C.
Bratz, Comment, Stare Decisis in Lower Courts: Predicting the Demise of Supreme
Court Precedent, 60 WAsH. L. REV. 87, 96 (1984) ("Justices' personalities, extra-judi-
cial utterances, and other subjective factors may be relevant .... [blut lower courts
should not apply these factors because reference to them violates the concept that
law is separate from the judges who declare it.").
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example, Professor Evan H. Caminker argues that using infor-
mation that will improve lower court predictions of higher court
decisions serves the values of judicial economy, uniformity, and
proficiency.30 7 Nonetheless, he would impose sharp limits on the
type of information that judges can use to make predictions.
3 08
He fears that if judges "routinely based their predictions on
hunches concerning how particular Justices would decide a legal
issue given their basic political ideologies and perceived agenda,"
people would be likely to believe that judicial decisions are
based on politics rather than principle." 9
I believe that a state court may appropriately consider person-
al, extra-judicial information about individual Supreme Court
justices in predicting how the Court would rule. Those who
challenge the legitimacy of considering such information are
being unrealistic. Although it might be improper to base a pre-
diction solely on such information, this scenario is unlikely to
occur. In almost all cases, a state court will also have a great
deal of additional information to use in making a prediction,
such as statutory language and legislative history, previous
Supreme Court decisions, and judicial opinions of individual
justices in similar cases. Information about an individual
justice's background or political and social views normally will
be used only as a supplement in a close case."0 In addition, if a
Supreme Court justice were to make his or her views on an
issue known in a speech or law review article, it may be virtu-
ally impossible for a state court wholly to ignore that informa-
tion. Finally, the goal is to make a correct prediction. Refusing
to consider any relevant information clearly conflicts with that
goal.
311
307. See Caminker, supra note 293, at 36-43; see also Note, The Attitude of Lower
Courts to Changing Precedents, 50 YALE L.J. 1448, 1455 (1941) (arguing that it is
appropriate to consider justices' "personal philosophies" in determining whether to
disregard a precedent).
308. See Caminker, supra note 293, at 19, 43-51 (noting the need for predictive
information to have high probative value).
309. Id. at 66.
310. See generally COFFIN, supra note 9, at 195-205 (discussing the "thought
ways" of judges and the reliability of such thoughts in divining decisions).
311. Many political scientists believe that political and ideological concerns play a
predominant role in judicial decisionmaking. See RONALD KAHN, THE SUPREME
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There is reason for caution, however, because prediction based
on assessment of individual Supreme Court justices poses sub-
stantial practical problems. Inquiries into the justices' personal
views may occasionally produce useful guidance, but it is ex-
tremely difficult to predict the precise influence of background or
personal philosophy in individual cases. Statements in speeches
or articles may not accurately reflect how a justice will vote af-
ter collegial deliberation and under the constraints of stare deci-
sis.3" Judge Frank Coffin cautions against pigeonholing judges
as "conservative" or "liberal," or as "strict" or "loose" construc-
tionists, or as favoring "judicial restraint" or "judicial activ-
ism." 1' Coffin complains that judges are filed under one or
more of these pairings as if craft constraints played no part at
all."31' He suggests that
[craft related factors, such as a case on point or clearly anal-
ogous, analysis of the evidence or a ruling by the trial court,
a procedural or jurisdictional requirement, a compelling pub-
lic policy, a close reading of legislative history, and consider-
ations of institutional appropriateness, will in the end decide
most cases.315
Judge Coffin continues:
All that I think can be justly said about the utility of apply-
ing overworked labels to judges is that they are appropriate
COURT AND CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY, 1953-1993, at 3 (1994) (asserting that
'[plolitical models of Supreme Court decisionmaking, which emphasize that justices
act like policymakers and are influenced by changes in the wider political system,
have dominated the intellectual landscape, especially among political scientists");
JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATITUDINAL
MODEL 64-69 (1993) (setting forth the attitudinal model of judicial decision-making);
Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A Case of Unfortunate
Interdisciplinary Ignorance, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 251 (1997) (examining and critiquing
the attitudinal model of decisionmaking). If this is true, it suggests that state court
judges should pay attention to the underlying social and political attitudes of indi-
vidual justices if they wish to make accurate predictions.
312. See Caminker, supra note 293, at 48.
313. COFFIN, supra note 9, at 200; see also Caminker, supra note 293, at 48-49
(suggesting that a Justice's personal ideological beliefs "likely will be more sophisti-
cated and nuanced than the general picture available to the public, which might be
limited to an approximate position on a spectrum ranging from left to right").
314. COFFIN, supra note 9, at 200.
315. Id. at 197.
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to some judges on some issues some of the time. But to use
them as generic descriptions characterizing judges on suppos-
edly major points of difference exaggerates the extent to
which they may fairly apply. They also carry such emotional
freight that they more often terminate than advance
thought.
3 16
In sum, a state court may legitimately consider personal infor-
mation about individual justices in predicting how they would
vote, but it would be wise to limit the weight given to such infor-
mation.
C. Applying the Predictive Approach to Routinely Recurring
Situations
Several situations repeatedly arise in state court decisions
ascertaining and applying federal law. These situations include
cases in which state courts must decide what weight to give to
older Supreme Court decisions that may have been superseded
or are simply ignored; cases in which there is no Supreme Court
precedent on point, but lower federal court decisions are numer-
ous and all point in the same direction; cases in which the lower
federal courts are split or splintered; cases in which state rul-
ings might be reviewed by the lower federal courts in habeas
corpus proceedings; and cases in which a lower state court has
to choose between conflicting interpretations of federal law by a
superior state court and the lower federal courts. The remainder
of this Article makes suggestions as to how state courts should
proceed in each of these situations.
1. Cases in Which the State Courts.Must Decide What Weight
to Give to Old or Outmoded Supreme Court Decisions
This situation is a variation of a problem that lower courts
face all the time. There is a higher court opinion on point, but
the lower court suspects that the higher court would no longer
follow it. Should the lower court simply follow the existing pre-
cedent, or should it decide the case the way it thinks the higher
316. Id. at 201.
1208
STANDARDS TO ASCERTAIN FEDERAL LAW
court would decide the case today? This is a very difficult judg-
ment call, and not surprisingly, lower courts disagree about how
to proceed. 17
The Supreme Court follows specified guidelines in deciding
whether to overrule its prior cases. The considerations are "pru-
dential and pragmatic" and "designed to test the consistency of
overruling a prior decision with the ideal of the rule of law, and
to gauge the respective costs of reaffirming and overruling a
prior case." 18 Age alone is not a reason to reject a precedent;
indeed, age makes some precedents venerable.3 9 Time, though,
may also erode a precedent. Developments in related areas may
"have left the old rule no more than a remnant of abandoned
doctrine," or facts may change or be seen so differently "as to...
[rob] the old rule of significant application or justification."
3 20
Despite its great reluctance to overturn prior cases interpreting
statutes,2' the Court will do so when "either the growth of
judicial doctrine or further action taken by Congress... have
removed or weakened the conceptual underpinnings from the
prior decision.., or where the later law has rendered the deci-
sion irreconcilable with competing legal doctrines or policies.3 22
The Court will also overrule prior cases when the standard it
announced proved unworkable.3
317. See Caminker, supra note 293, at 19-20 and nn.71-75. See generally C. Ste-
yen Bradford, Following Dead Precedent: The Supreme Court's Ill-Advised Rejection of
Anticipatory Overruling, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 39 (1990) (discussing the course lower
courts should follow); Maurice Kelman, The Force of Precedent in the Lower Courts,
14 WAYNE L. REV. 3 (1967) (same); Margaret N. Kniffin, Overruling Supreme Court
Precedents: Anticipatory Action by United States Courts of Appeals, 51 FoRDHAM L.
REV. 53 (1982) (same).
318. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992).
319. See, e.g., Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940) (stating that stare
decisis is "not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision, however re-
cent and questionable, when such adherence involves collision with a prior doctrine
more embracing in its scope, intrinsically sound, and verified by experience").
320. Casey, 505 U.S. at 855.
321. See supra note 228 and accompanying text.
322. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173 (1989); see also Rodri-
guez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989) (noting that
the Court will overrule a prior decision construing a statute in order to "achieve a
uniform interpretation of similar statutory language ... [or] to correct a seriously
erroneous interpretation of statutory language that would undermine congressional
policy as expressed in other legislation").
323. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 854 (asking "whether the rule has proven to be intol-
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State courts should follow these guidelines, but obviously they
should proceed with great caution before "underruling" the
Supreme Court. 24 A state judge must not only be sure in her
own mind that one or more of the above conditions is satisfied,
but also be reasonably sure that the Supreme Court would
agree. The Supreme Court can be unpleasant when it thinks
its decisions are being flouted. For example, in Hutto v. Davis
32 5
the Court berated the Fourth Circuit for declining to follow a
controlling Supreme Court precedent, accusing the court of "hav-
ing ignored, consciously or unconsciously, the hierarchy of the
federal court system."326 The Court concluded: "[U]nless we wish
anarchy to prevail within the federal judicial system, a prece-
dent of this Court must be followed by the lower federal courts
no matter how misguided the judges of those courts may think it
to be."3 27 There is no reason to think the Court would be more
forgiving of state courts that declined to follow Supreme Court
precedent on matters of federal law.
In addition, the Court recently instructed the federal circuit
courts to follow a Supreme Court decision directly on point even
though the lower court believes the Supreme Court would no
longer follow it:
We do not suggest that the Court of Appeals on its own au-
thority should have taken the step of renouncing Wilko [v.
Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953)]. If a precedent of this Court has
direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons
erable simply in defying practical workability"); Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808,
827 (1991) (noting that the Court has not followed "governing decisions [that] are
unworkable or are badly reasoned"); Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 116
(1965) (inquiring whether the rule is "unworkable in practice").
324. See COFFIN, supra note 8, at 59-60. Judge Coffin writes:
In the federal courts of appeal one would seldom-very seldom-urge a
departure from Supreme Court rulings, whether constitutional ones or
not. Only in the rare case of a ruling remote in time, where the advent
of obvious changes in conditions and a tide of critical comment have sig-
naled a time for interment, would an inferior appellate court essay the
task of burial.
Id.
325. 454 U.S. 370 (1982).
326. Id. at 374-75.
327. Id. at 375.
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rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals
should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this
Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions."
Michael Dorf found this admonishment surprising because the
circuit court did not actually predict what the Supreme Court
would do, but rather relied on Supreme Court decisions that it
believed had overruled Wilko sub silentio.3 29 He protested that
the Supreme Court "appears to confuse the power to declare a
precedent dead with the power to kill it.""' Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court appears to believe that lower federal
courts-and presumably state courts as well-should not have
the power to do either.
The Supreme Court may take this position because it has the
power to resuscitate apparently dead precedent and will occa-
sionally choose to do so. For example, in Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson331 the Court revived Moore v.
Chesapeake & Ohio Railway,3 32 a 1934 decision restricting feder-
al subject matter jurisdiction that had "never been relied upon
or even cited" by the Court." Similarly, in Younger v. Harris"
the Court revived Fenner v. Boykin,3 35 a Supreme Court decision
applying strict standards for federal injunctions against threat-
ened state criminal proceedings that had been ignored for thirty
years.3 6 As a result, a state court should proceed with great cau-
tion before predicting the demise of a Supreme Court precedent.
328. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989).
329. See Dorf, supra note 292, at 676-77 n.87.
330. Id.
331. 478 U.S. 804 (1986).
332. 291 U.S. 205 (1934).
333. Merrell Dow Pharms., 478 U.S. at 821-22 n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
334. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
335. 271 U.S. 240 (1926).
336. See Donald H. Zeigler, An Accommodation of the Younger Doctrine and the
Duty of the Federal Courts to Enforce Constitutional Safeguards in the State Crim-
inal Process, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 266, 273-80 (1976).
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2. Cases in Which There is No Supreme Court Precedent on
Point, but Lower Federal Court Decisions are Numerous and
Consistent
State courts generally should consider themselves bound by
lower federal court decisions when many federal courts have
considered an issue and all have reached the same conclusion.
The more federal courts that have agreed, the more strongly the
state courts should consider themselves bound. When many cir-
cuits consider an issue and all rule the same way, the case for
following their lead becomes very strong indeed.3
No court likes to be overruled; 38 therefore, the federal courts
also consider how the Supreme Court would rule when they
decide a case. 39 If many federal courts decide a question the
same way, chances are good that they have decided it the way
337. Shah v. Glendale Fed. Bank, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 417 (Ct. App. 1996), provides
a model of how a state court should proceed in this situation. Plaintiff debtors
brought suit against the bank for breach of contract. See id. at 418. While the case
was pending, they filed for bankruptcy. See id. Subsequently, the state action was
dismissed and the debtors appealed. See id. The debtors then moved to delay the
appeal based on the automatic stay provided in bankruptcy proceedings. See id. The
court began by reviewing the rules of statutory construction applied by the Supreme
Court. See id. at 418-19. Looking at the language of the bankruptcy statute, the
court concluded that it imposed an automatic stay only of proceedings against a
debtor, not proceedings initiated by a debtor. See id. at 420. The court noted that
this reading of the statute was consistent with the policy underlying the provision.
See id. Moreover, seven federal circuits, the bankruptcy courts, and courts of several
other states all agreed with this interpretation. See id. Considering the plaintiffs' ap-
peal a continuation of their original action, the court followed the unanimous opinion
that the automatic stay provision was inapplicable and ordered the appeal to pro-
ceed. See id. at 422.
338. See Caminker, supra note 6, at 827 n.40 ("Much anecdotal evidence suggests
that inferior court judges fear being reversed on appeal because their professional
audience . . . may question their legal judgment or abilities."); Jonathan R. Macey,
The Internal and External Costs and Benefits of Stare Decisis, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
93, 111 (1989) ("[Rleversals by higher courts are embarrassing and serve to curtail
attempts by renegade judges to ignore precedent.").
339. See, e.g., Vukasovich, Inc. v. Commissioner, 790 F.2d 1409, 1416 (9th Cir.
1986) ("[The courts of appeal should decide cases according to their reasoned view
of the way [sic] Supreme Court would decide the pending case today."); Spector
Motor Serv. v. Walsh, 139 F.2d 809, 814 (2d Cir. 1943) ("[Our function cannot be
limited to a mere blind adherence to precedent. We must determine with the best
exercise of our mental powers of which we are capable that law which in all proba-
bility will be applied to these litigants or to others similarly situated."), vacated sub
nom. Spector Motor Serv. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101 (1944).
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the Supreme Court would decide it. In addition, a state court
should be reluctant to break with unanimous opinion on a feder-
al question because a split in the case law may eventually
require the Supreme Court to review the issue. 4 Thus, if feder-
al court decisions are numerous and consistent, a state court
must have very strong reasons for reaching a different decision.
As with any rule of stare decisis, however, there are always
exceptions. The Supreme Court occasionally disagrees with the
unanimous opinion of the lower federal courts. For example, in
McNally v. United States,34' the Supreme Court held that a fed-
eral mail fraud statute applies only to schemes to deprive people
of money or property, and not to schemes to deprive people of
other rights, despite unanimous lower court decisions to the con-
trary. 42 Similarly, in Rizzo v. Goodes the Supreme Court held
that state police officials are not liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
unless they affirmatively direct their subordinates to violate citi-
zens' civil rights, though ten circuit courts had held that mere
acquiescence in such behavior sufficed.' Thus, if a state court
sincerely believes that the Supreme Court would not follow
unanimous lower federal court opinion, it should rule the way it
believes the high court would rule.
3. Cases in Which the Lower Federal Courts Are Split or
Splintered
State courts often must interpret and apply federal law when
the Supreme Court has not ruled and the lower federal courts
are in conflict. The proposed approach is particularly helpful in
this situation because it gives state courts a perspective that
may help them choose among competing interpretations. By defi-
nition, the situation is one in which reasonable minds have
340. See COFFIN, supra note 8, at 261 (noting that a federal court of appeals will
"not lightly disagree with another circuit" or with several circuits, as "[ilt does not
desire to create a split among the circuits and thus add to the potential caseload of
the Supreme Court").
341. 483 U.S. 350 (1987).
342. See id. at 362-64 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
343. 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
344. See Id. at 385 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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differed. By deciding the federal issue the way they think the
Supreme Court would decide it, the state courts have the best
chance of resolving the conflict in a way that will lead to an
eventual consensus.345
Categorical approaches ("bound" and "not bound") are not very
helpful. When federal decisions conflict, state courts cannot be
bound by all of them. As noted above, some state courts resolve
this dilemma by saying they are bound by the better reasoned
decisions. 34' This is a clever resolution, but not the optimal solu-
tion. A decision by a state court to follow its own circuit may
seriously interfere with the goal of achieving national unifor-
345. Penrod Drilling Corp. v. Williams, 868 S.W.2d 294 (Tex. 1993), provides a
model of how a state court should proceed when there is a split in lower federal
court precedent. The plaintiff, a seaman, was injured while working on an offshore
oil rig. See id. at 295. He brought suit in Texas state court and asserted two federal
causes of action-one for violation of the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1989), and the
other for breach of warranty of seaworthiness under general maritime law. Penrod
Drilling, 868 S.W.2d at 295. He sought punitive damages on both claims. See id.
The trial court refused to allow punitive damages, but the Texas Court of Appeals
reversed in part, holding that while punitive damages could not be obtained under
the Jones Act, they could be granted under general maritime law. See id. at 296.
The Court of Appeals noted that the Supreme Court recently had held that "non-pe-
cuniary" damages, such as loss of society, could not be recovered under either the
Jones Act or general maritime law. See id. (citing Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498
U.S. 19 (1990)). Moreover, several lower federal courts had extended the rationale of
Miles and held that punitive damages could not be obtained under general maritime
law. Nonetheless, the intermediate appellate court felt bound to follow a Fifth Cir-
cuit case decided before Miles that allowed punitive damages in such actions. See id.
The Texas Supreme Court reversed, following the weight of authority in the
lower federal courts that punitive damages should not be allowed for claims under
general maritime law. See id. at 297. In reaching this conclusion, the court carefully
reviewed the Supreme Court decision in Miles and concluded that Miles's rationale
"compels its extension to the present case." Id. at 296. Punitive damages had been
deemed "non-pecuniary" in several cases, and the Supreme Court had expressed a
desire for uniformity and consistency between general maritime law and the Jones
Act. See id. at 296-97.
Although the Texas Supreme Court did not say so explicitly, it decided this
case the way it thought the Supreme Court would, using lower federal court prece-
dent for guidance. The court clearly opted to further national uniformity over unifor-
mity between federal and state courts in Texas. The intrastate disagreement was
short-lived, as two years later, the Fifth Circuit held that its earlier precedent was
no longer good law and adopted the holding of the Texas Supreme Court. See
Guevara v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 59 F.3d 1496, 1507 (5th Cir. 1995).
346. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
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mity.347 It also does not make sense to ignore federal court deci-
sions. Federal cases often provide thoughtful discussions and
may lay out the arguments and counterarguments for different
positions with great care. Federal decisions should be given the
opportunity to be persuasive. Thus, state courts should resolve
the conflict by deciding the way they think the Supreme Court
would decide.
4. Cases in Which State Rulings Might Be Reviewed by the
Lower Federal Courts by Way of Habeas Corpus
Many state courts give federal court precedent particular
weight in cases in which a defendant can seek federal habeas
corpus relief at the conclusion of his state criminal proceed-
ings. 4 ' Although a habeas corpus action is technically a collater-
al proceeding,349 as a practical matter the lower federal courts
exercise appellate jurisdiction over the state courts in such cas-
es."' A court generally must follow the decisions of courts that
can reverse it; therefore state courts are wise to pay particular
attention to lower federal court rulings when habeas review is
possible.35'
Again, however, deference should not be automatic. Lower
federal court precedent often should be considered persuasive
rather than mandatory. It matters greatly, for example, whether
the federal precedent that would entitle the defendant to habeas
relief is from the local circuit court or from some other circuit.
Given that only the local federal circuit can review the defen-
dant's constitutional claims, the state court can safely regard
precedent from another circuit as persuasive only. It also mat-
ters whether a district or circuit court rendered the federal deci-
347. See supra notes 207-09 and accompanying text.
348. See supra notes 56-66 and accompanying text.
349. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 780 (2d ed. 1994) ("Techni-
cally, federal court consideration of the habeas corpus petition is not considered a di-
rect review of the state court decision; rather, the petition constitutes a separate civ-
il suit filed in federal court and is termed collateral relief.").
350. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
351. See Ragazzo, supra note 6, at 742 n.255 (asserting that "it makes eminent
good sense" for state courts to follow the decisions of the local federal court of ap-
peals when habeas review is possible).
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sion, even if the decision is local. A district court ruling does not
bind other federal district judges. 2 Thus, a state criminal defen-
dant will not necessarily benefit from a federal district court
ruling if his habeas petition goes to a different federal district
judge. A circuit court ruling, however, binds all of the district
judges in the circuit 53 and thus must be enforced by any federal
district judge to whom the defendant might apply.
In addition, Congress and the Supreme Court have restricted
federal habeas corpus dramatically in recent years, thus reduc-
ing the situations in which state prisoners can obtain relief. 54
In particular, recent reforms prohibit the federal courts from
announcing new constitutional principles in habeas corpus cases
except in very rare circumstances and from granting relief ex-
cept on the basis of clearly established Supreme Court prece-
dent. Thus, when a state court refuses to recognize a novel fed-
eral constitutional claim, it need not worry that a federal court
will do so in a subsequent federal habeas corpus proceeding. Fi-
nally, state judges no longer need consider themselves bound by
a local federal circuit court decision announcing a new constitu-
352. See, e.g., Mendenhall v. Cedarapids, Inc., 5 F.3d 1557, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1993);
TMF Tool Co., Inc. v. Muller, 913 F.2d 1185, 1191 (7th Cir. 1990).
353. See United States v. Mitlo, 714 F.2d 294, 298 (3d Cir. 1983) (stating that
circuit rulings bind all inferior courts within the circuit).
354. The Warren Court greatly liberalized the availability of habeas corpus, ex-
tending it to all federal constitutional claims, see Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 464-
65 (1953), and allowing consideration of claims not raised in state court unless the
petitioner deliberately bypassed available state remedies. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S.
391, 398-99 (1963). What the Warren Court gave, however, the Burger and
Rehnquist Courts have taken away. The Burger Court forbade federal reconsideration
of Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule claims, see Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465,
481-82 (1976), and refused to allow consideration of claims not raised in state court
unless the petitioner could demonstrate 'good cause" for not raising the claim and
"prejudice" so severe that he would not have been convicted but for the constitu-
tional error. See United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982); Wainwright v.
Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977). The Rehnquist Court has erected many additional
procedural hurdles that often block review. Habeas petitions may not mix exhausted
and unexhausted claims. See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 522 (1982). In addition,
the cause and prejudice standard applies to failure to raise all claims in one peti-
tion, thus effectively barring successive applications. See McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S.
467, 493 (1991). The cause and prejudice standard also applies to failure to develop
material facts in the course of the state criminal proceeding, thus further limiting
evidentiary hearings in federal court. See Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 12
(1992).
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tional rule because the federal courts will not apply that rule in
a habeas proceeding. 5
In Teague v. Lane,356 the Supreme Court forbade federal
courts, itself included, from announcing new criminal constitu-
tional rights in habeas corpus proceedings except in very limited
circumstances. 57 The Court imposed this restriction indirectly
by instructing federal courts to decide whether a new right
should be applied retroactively before announcing it.358 If it
should not be, the court should not use the right to grant relief
in the case before it.3 59 The Court then held that a new right
should be applied retroactively only in two narrow circumstanc-
es: (1) "if it places 'certain kinds of primary, private individual
conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority
to proscribe'"; or (2) "if it requires the observance of 'those proce-
dures that ... are "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.'"
36
If a new right does not fall within one of these exceptions, it
cannot be applied to a state habeas petitioner. Thus, as a prac-
tical matter, the Court's holding in Teague means that federal
courts almost never can announce new criminal constitutional
rules in habeas corpus cases.36'
Teague does not preclude a federal court from granting habeas
relief based on a new constitutional rule if the court announced
the new rule in another context before the habeas petitioner's
355. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Clark, 710 A.2d 31, 39 (Pa. 1998) (noting that
state court was not bound by the decisions of federal courts).
356. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
357. See id. at 304-10.
358. See id.
359. See id. at 310.
360. Id. at 307 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692-93 (1971)
(Harlan, J., concurring in the judgments and dissenting in part) (quoting Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937))).
361. Teague provoked extensive critical commentary. See, e.g., Marc M. Arkin, The
Prisoner's Dilemma: Life in the Lower Federal Courts After Teague v. Lane, 69 N.C.
L. REV. 371 (1991); Vivian Berger, Justice Delayed or Justice Denied?-A Comment
on Recent Proposals to Reform Death Penalty Habeas Corpus, 90 COLUrI. L. REV.
1665 (1990); David R. Dow, Teague and Deatk The Impact of Current Retroactivity
Doctrine on Capital Defendants, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 23 (1991); Richard H.
Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional
Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731 (1991); Barry Friedman, Habeas and Hubris, 45
VAND. L. REV. 797 (1992).
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state criminal proceedings became final. 62 Thus, if the Supreme
Court announces a new rule in reviewing a state court or lower
federal court decision, or if a lower federal court announces a
new rule in a federal criminal case, Teague would allow habeas
relief. Congress partially closed this loophole and imposed fur-
ther restrictions on federal habeas corpus in the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.363 The Act relieves
state courts of any obligation to consider new constitutional
rulings by the lower federal courts in federal criminal cases and
makes it even harder for federal habeas petitioners to win."'
Congress amended 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) to read as follows:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a per-
son in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court
shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adju-
dicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the
adjudication of the claim -
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,
as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented
in the State court proceeding.36
Under the statute, a federal court can grant a habeas petition
only if the state court failed to apply "clearly established Federal
law, as determined by the Supreme Court.3 66 This seems to pro-
hibit habeas relief based on new constitutional rights announced
in prior lower federal court rulings. Thus, even if the local feder-
al circuit court announced a new constitutional rule before a
362. A case is final for these purposes if the conviction has been entered and di-
rect appeals are complete, or if the time to pursue appeals has passed. See Teague,
489 U.S. at 295.
363. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244,
2253-55, 2261-66 (Supp. II 1996)). For excellent discussions of the many twists and
turns of this law, see Lee, supra note 168; Larry W. Yackle, A Primer on the New
Habeas Corpus Statute, 44 BUFF. L. REv. 381 (1996); Note, Rewriting the Great Writ:
Standards of Review for Habeas Corpus Under the New 28 U.S.C. § 2254, 110 HARV.
L. REV. 1868 (1997).
364. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
365. Id.
366. Id. (emphasis added)
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state criminal defendant's conviction became final, the federal
courts could not apply that rule in the defendant's subsequent
habeas corpus proceeding. In addition, habeas relief can be
granted only if the state court decision involved an "unreason-
able application" of Supreme Court precedent. 67 This suggests
that a state court must do something more than simply apply
Supreme Court cases incorrectly for habeas relief to be war-
ranted. 68
The Act imposes several other restrictions on habeas corpus.
It applies a one-year statute of limitations to habeas applica-
tions.369 It imposes further limits on successive petitions .37  The
Act also expressly limits a federal court's power to hold an evi-
dentiary hearing.
371
Neither Teague nor the Act forbid habeas relief if a federal
court concludes that it is applying old law rather than announc-
367. See id.
368. See RicHARD H. FALLON ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 97 (4th ed. Supp. 1997) (suggesting that the "unreason-
ableness" standard means that federal courts may no longer make a de novo deter-
mination of federal constitutional claims in habeas petitions).
369. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). The statute of limitations generally runs from the
time the conviction becomes final "by the conclusion of direct review or the expira-
tion of the time for seeking such review." Id. § 2244(d)(1)(A).
370. See McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 494-95 (1991) (suggesting that a peti-
tioner might file a successive petition when he could show cause for failing to raise
a claim in his first petition and actual prejudice from the error in his case, or when
he could show that the constitutional violation caused the conviction of an innocent
person even if he could not show good cause for having failed to raise the claim).
Under the Act, the petitioner must show cause for having failed to raise the claim
and show actual innocence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(i-ii).
371. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), factual findings in a state proceeding are pre-
sumed to be correct. Under subsection (e)(2), if a petitioner has failed to develop the
facts in state court proceedings, a federal court cannot hold a hearing unless the pe-
titioner makes several showings. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). He must show that:
(A) the claim relies on-
(i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collat-
eral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or
(ii) a factual predicate that could not have been previously discovered
through the exercise of due diligence; and
(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by
clear and convincing evidence that but for the constitutional error, no
reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the under-
lying offense.
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ing a new constitutional principle. The Supreme Court admitted
in Teague that it is often difficult to determine whether a case
announces a new rule or merely involves a novel application of
an old rule. 2 In general, the Court stated, "a case announces a
new rule when it breaks new ground or imposes a new obliga-
tion on the States or the Federal Government" or "if the result
was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defen-
dant's conviction became final.373 Presumably, then, a case does
not announce a new rule if it does not break new ground or if
the result is dictated by (Supreme Court) precedent that existed
before the defendant's conviction became final 4 Thus, under
Teague and the Act, a federal court may still grant habeas relief
if it concludes that it is applying established Supreme Court
precedent that should have been applied by state courts during
the petitioner's state criminal proceedings.
The bottom line for state court judges is that they should con-
sider themselves bound by established Supreme Court prece-
dent, but they need not consider themselves bound by the
criminal constitutional rulings of the local federal circuit and
district courts. Persons convicted of crimes in state court may
still apply for habeas corpus relief, but they must run a proce-
dural gauntlet and will obtain relief only if they can show that
the state court unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent
that was clearly established before their conviction became final.
Of course, state courts may choose to follow lower federal court
decisions setting new constitutional standards if they so desire.
They should, however, determine whether to follow a circuit or
district court decision based on what they think the Supreme
Court would decide instead of making the determination based
372. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989).
373. Id.
374. Both the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts are struggling with
these criteria. See DONALD L. DOERNBERG & C. KEITH WINGATE, FEDERAL COURTS,
FEDERALISM, AND SEPARATION OF POWERS: CASES AND MATERIALS 856 (1994). Com-
pare Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333 (1993), Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227 (1990),
Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484 (1990), and Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407 (1990)
(refusing habeas relief because in each case prior precedent did not dictate the re-
sult the petitioners sought), with Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222 (1992) (holding
that the petition did not seek application of a new rule and thus was not Teague-
barred).
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on the fear that they will be reversed on federal habeas corpus
review.
5. Cases in Which a Lower State Court Has to Choose
Between the Interpretation of a Superior State Court and a
Lower Federal Court
Lower state courts face this problem whenever higher state
courts and the lower federal courts disagree as to the meaning of
federal law. State courts are split on what to do in this situa-
tion. 75 Once again, categorical rules are not appropriate. Gener-
ally, lower state courts should follow higher state courts; howev-
er, if they strongly believe that the Supreme Court would decide
the issue the way the lower federal courts have decided it, they
probably should follow the lower federal courts and attempt to
convince the higher state courts to alter their position.
Lower state courts are in an extremely difficult position here.
It is a fundamental rule of stare decisis that lower courts are
bound by the decisions of superior courts in their judicial hierar-
chy. 6 A lower court must pay particular attention to the deci-
sions of a higher court that can reverse it. 7 Thus, state trial
courts ordinarily must follow the decisions of an intermediate
appellate court in the direct line of review and of the state
supreme court.
Every rule of stare decisis has exceptions. What if ten federal
circuits have taken a position at odds with the state supreme
court, and the lower state court is virtually certain that the
375. See supra notes 74-84 and accompanying text.
376. See, e.g., Colby v. J.C. Penney Co., 811 F.2d 1119, 1123 (7th Cir. 1987) (stat-
ing that superior court decisions bind inferior courts); Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v.
Superior Court, 369 P.2d 937, 939 (Cal. 1962) ("Under the doctrine of stare decisis,
all tribunals exercising inferior jurisdiction are required to follow decisions of courts
exercising superior jurisdiction. Otherwise, the doctrine of stare decisis makes no
sense.").
377. See, e.g., United States v. Mitlo, 714 F.2d 294, 298 (3d Cir. 1983) (stating
that circuit court decisions bind the district courts in that circuit); RICHARD K.
NEUiANN, JR., LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL WRITING: STRUCTURE, STRATEGY, AND
STYLE 113 (3d ed. 1998) (stating that an appellate decision is mandatory authority
for a lower court if it is made by an appellate court to which the matter at hand
could be appealed); Caminker, supra note 6, at 824 ("A court must follow the pre-
cedents established by the court(s) directly above it.").
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Supreme Court would agree with the circuits? In this situation,
the state supreme court is like an intermediate appellate court.
The Supremacy Clause requires the lower state court to apply
federal law. 378 Should the lower court follow what it thinks
federal law really is, or follow the ruling of a court that does not
have the final word on the matter? The American system of
hierarchical precedent would not break down if a lower state
court occasionally chose the former option.
CONCLUSION
This Article has proposed that the state courts adopt a uni-
form approach for ascertaining federal law. The approach should
be the same that the Supreme Court mandated for the federal
courts in the analogous situation when federal courts must
ascertain state law. The state courts should decide questions of
federal law the way that they believe the Supreme Court would
decide them. This approach would best further the goals of cor-
rect and uniform interpretation of federal law. As Justices
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter stated in their joint opinion for
the Court in Planned Parenthood v. Casey: "Liberty finds no
refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt."37 No approach to finding
federal law can eliminate all doubt, but the approach proposed
here can help achieve greater certainty.
378. See supra notes 147-49 and accompanying text.
379. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992).
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